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ABSTRACT / EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In today’s highly globalized and technological societies, it has become more difficult for public 
entities to maintain high quality public services, especially given recent ecological concerns. 
Thus, many public entities have turned to privatisation, promising to maintain public service 
with the efficiency of private companies and markets. Nonetheless, there are clear drawbacks 
to privatisation, such as the promised public services being drowned out in favour of more 
profitable schemes. The compromise, here, is the ascension of public-private-partnerships 
(PPPs), which are agreements in which private entities are bound to maintain certain public 
services while taking ownership, in limited form, of public property. The concerns of relying 
on PPPs for utility services are explored in this dissertation. In particular, the case of Eskom 
taking control of electricity provision in South Africa through a PPP is assessed in the context 
of a similar arrangement in Germany. It is the conclusion of this dissertation that if 
administrative law is not responsive to the threats to the impoverished populations in South 
Africa not having access to electricity, then an infringement of fundamental human rights may 
occur.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to study 
Administrative law is the “body of constitutional provisions, statutes, court decisions, 
executive orders, and other official directives that, first, (a) regulate the procedures agencies 
use in adjudicating, rule-making, and adopting policies, (b) control the exercise of their 
authority to laws and regulations, and (c) govern the extent to which administration is open to 
public scrutiny.“1 Administrative law allows for judicial review of the actions and decisions of 
public bodies and officials who exercise public power or perform public functions.2 The line 
between the public and the private bodies is no longer clear due to privatisation.3  Decisions on 
whether to apply public or private law to decisions made by judicial bodies have become 
increasingly contentious and confusing, leading to major difficulties in interpreting the 
behaviour of public officials and private individuals and organisations. One of the main 
objectives of administrative law is to prevent the abuse of public power.4 To this end, 
administrative law is characterised by two features, namely, accountability and empowerment. 
These features are intended to function as a single unit under a broader public constitutional 
right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.5  
The previously clear distinction between public and private bodies and their powers and 
functions made it easier to classify actions and decisions made by public authorities as either 
administrative acts, therefore subject to judicial review, and those which were not. Since this is 
no longer a simple administrative law has had to be adapted, revised and re-invented, in some 
cases, in response to the changing dynamics of South Africa. The move towards privatisation, 
which is the cause of the blurred line between the public and the private, has brought about the 
question of which legal principles to apply to whom, as the public and private bodies now 
                                                             
1 Rosenbloom, D. Administrative law for public managers. Westview Press, 2014: p. 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Cane, P. Administrative law. OUP Oxford, 2011. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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perform each other’s functions through private law (contracts), thus leading to confusion as to 
whether to apply public law or private law principles. The legal uncertainties left by the divide 
and the blurred distinction thus expose an accountability gap. 
1.2 Statement of the research problem 
Although the benefits of privatisation are numerous and advantages have accrued from 
privatisation in Africa generally and indeed in South Africa, the exercise has also impacted 
negatively on socio-economic rights and service delivery. With privatisation, the role of the 
state in providing these services is effectively eliminated and replaced by the private sector over 
whom the state has no direct control or fails to exercise control over. Even though there has 
been an increase in the production levels of some goods and utility services, such as electricity 
and water, it is unfortunate that with people increasingly losing their jobs due to public 
enterprises becoming privatised, these people can no longer afford to pay the increased costs of 
these services. This has been the case with electricity in South Africa where the full cost 
recovery model and the introduction of pre-paid meters has led to disconnections of electricity 
to those who cannot afford to buy electricity, thus reducing access to an important component 
of sustainability. This issue of reduced access is driven by profit motives and cost recovery on 
the one hand, versus poverty, unemployment and an inability to pay on the other. This inevitably 
impacts negatively on the ability to access electricity and results in the curtailing of the 
enjoyment of other socio-economic rights and services such as education, food, health care and 
housing.  
1.3 Focus and objectives of the study 
This dissertation addresses issues around aspects of administrative law such as 
privatisation, procurement, public-private partnerships (PPPs) and accountability enhancement 
of the latter. The specific objective of the study is to establish whether in South Africa the 
privatisation of electricity provision through Eskom, would lead to a denial of access to 
electricity, through the lack of financial strength to pay for the continued use of electricity 
9 
because of high rates and resultant inability to pay.  Against the backdrop of a general 
comparison of South African and German administrative law, the above factual matrices will 
be grappled with and examined in detail through the addressing of questions such as how should 
administrative law respond to the phenomenon of privatisation through PPPs. Will the desired 
forces of competition achieve adequate levels of fairness and individual justice in a country like 
South Africa?  
The dissertation examines whether privatisation which is primarily aimed at improving 
service delivery and bringing countries in line with the principles of globalisation will achieve 
these objectives. The various factual permutations will be considered, considering the German 
and South African approaches to such practical situations and the underlying policy factors that 
influence the law. Based on this critical evaluation, recommendations are made for the 
development of South African law.  
1.4 Significance of the study 
Many African countries are attempting to privatise previously public enterprises under 
the advice and guidance of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other 
similar agencies. This study is aimed at addressing the impact of the privatisation of socio-
economic rights, more specifically the right of access to electricity, which in itself is not a right 
that is explicitly provided for in the Constitution. It can, however, be argued that electricity has 
become an integral part of daily life and it cannot be disputed that it has made daily living much 
more efficient. Considering the current energy crisis and previously frequent power cuts in the 
form of “load shedding”, it is necessary to analyse where the law stands regarding the right of 
access to electricity. Is there a duty on government to provide free basic electricity to the people 
of South Africa? To address this question, the examination must include various pieces of 
national legislation, national government plans and policies to determine whether such a duty 
exists. 
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1.5 Research questions 
This dissertation is intended to provide answers to the following questions: 
• What are the specific effects of the privatisation of public services, such as the 
operation of utilities? 
• What are the specific effects of the establishment of PPPs by governments and 
private entities?  
• How have the recently-established PPPs in the electricity industry in Germany 
affected the population of Germany?  
• Based on the effects of PPPs in the Germany electricity industry, what effects 
are expected from the Eskom PPPs in South Africa? 
• Do the Eskom PPPs endanger the rights of South African populations, such that 
there are constitutional violations? 
• How should administrative law be adapted to be appropriately responsive to 
PPPs in South Africa? 
1.6 South African administrative law and privatisation overview 
When embarking on the exploration of South African administrative law, one may be 
forgiven for feeling lost and overwhelmed by the system which has been described as a ‘dismal 
science,’6 a descriptive label which Corder says was very fitting at the end of the apartheid 
period.7 This opinion is owing to the fact that South Africa’s administrative law system was 
marooned in a time capsule, with little to no chance of escape due to various reasons pertaining 
to the constitutional and political systems under which South Africa was governed from 1910. 
In 1993, Corder wrote that one of the leading reasons for our administrative system 
being termed a dismal science was because of the legislature’s lack of proper consideration of 
                                                             
6 Dean, B Our administrative law: a dismal science? (1986) 2 SAJHR 164. 
7 Corder, H Introduction: Administrative Law Reform (1993) Acta Juridica 1 at 1-2. 
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one the fundamental principles of democracy, the separation of powers doctrine. The legislature 
had given the executive branch of government unfettered power in matters relating to race 
discrimination and to the oppression of opposition.8  One of the main objectives of 
administrative law is to prevent the abuse of public power. To this end, administrative law is 
characterised by two features, namely, accountability and empowerment. Corder further stated 
that there was an urgent need for South Africa to establish a system that embodies both the 
empowerment and accountability aspects of administrative law for the South African 
executive.9 He also argued that without a shadow of a doubt, it was imperative that any 
restructuring of social relations, for the purposes of remedying the wrongs committed against 
the majority in South Africa, would need to be spearheaded by the government and to this end 
the government would have to interfere in both the economy and society, a process that would 
be heavily reliant on administrative discretion.10 It was further argued that mechanisms would 
have to be put in place which would serve to hold the administration accountable to the public 
for its actions if a more just and democratic future was to be achieved.11  
What is of interest is that at the time this article was written, it was not the African 
National Congress that was in power, it was the National Party. Thus, the article was directed 
at a non-democratic government and during the constitutional negotiations, a time that was to 
lead to our democratic dispensation and rule by the people. With this in mind, there is more 
reason for concern that South Africa seems bound to repeat history and indeed to still be stuck 
on certain issues that existed during 1993. It is argued that the constitutional system is still 
struggling with an executive that has an overwhelming amount of power, which it arguably uses 
to achieve its own ends and which is exceedingly corrupt. Accountability is still prioritised over 
empowerment despite having laws such as the Constitution and the Promotion of 
                                                             
8 Ibid, at 1.  
9 Ibid at 2. 
10 Ibid at 5. 
11 Ibid. 
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Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),12 and even though attempts have been made to restructure 
the economy through Black Economic Empowerment policies and to remedy the wrongs 
committed by the minority during apartheid, a satisfactory level of success has not been 
reached. Public law mechanisms (such as in the provisions of PAJA, which call for 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair) to hold the administration 
accountable to the public were indeed put in place as was envisioned in 1993. Decisions which 
were made by the administration, using public power or public funds were subjected to judicial 
scrutiny through judicial review and this process was meant to further enhance our democracy. 
Amongst the numerous issues that South Africa had to consider was that of privatisation and 
the effect that this would have on administrative law as a whole. 
1.7 Methodology 
This research is primarily library-based and relies on materials such as textbooks, law 
journals, newspaper articles, reports, laws, regulations, privatisation contracts, government 
publications and papers presented on the subject. Hard and electronic sources accessed on the 
Internet have also been used. 
1.8 Limitation and scope 
This study begins with a general overview of privatisation, public-private partnership 
agreements and more specifically such matters as they relate to Eskom. This will be followed 
by the legal framework of privatisation and PPPs and how this impacts the provision of 
electricity and service delivery in South Africa. Throughout the paper reference is made to 
private service providers and non-state actors who ultimately have assumed the traditional role 
of the state to provide basic services when PPP agreements are entered into. The focus will then 
shift towards how Germany has implemented PPPs in the electricity industry. The importance 
of this is that the German PPP implementation in the electricity industry will be used to gauge 
                                                             
12 Plasket, C. "The Exhaustion of Internal Remedies and Section 7 (2) of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000." SALJ 119 (2002): 59. 
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how a similar implementation in South Africa may turn out. An evaluation, recommendations 
and a conclusion will then be made on how the privatisation process through PPP agreements 
can be streamlined and the monitoring and regulatory mechanisms strengthened to ensure 
accountability of non-state actors and of the state in situations where its status as a party to a 
PPP contract may on the face of it allow the state to act as if it were a private actor as opposed 
to being bound by the broader constitutional context.  
1.9 Summary of chapters 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter will set out the content of the 
reseach, identify the problem and outline the methodology. Chapter two gives a general 
coverage of privatisation, public private partnership agreements, the regulatoy framewok of the 
latter and former theories as well as case studies on other African countries who have one 
through privatisation or are currently attempting to. Chapter three grapples with the notion of 
government contracts and the classification of the states activities to determine which law 
should apply in the context. The key argument of chapter three is that South African law should 
not stubbonly stick to the strict classification of public and private law, because there is an 
undeniable mingling of these two frameworks of the law. The classification should not be 
strictly adhered to due to the fact that the state is always different even when contracting 
pivately for the delivery of certain goods or services. Towards the end of the third chapter the 
dissertation will address the responsibilities of state and non-state actors in privatisation and 
ppp contracts in the delivering of basic services. Chapter four will be a continuation of chapter 
three but will look more specifically at how Germany has dealt with the fact that the state should 
always be treated differently even if it is contracting and thus acting under private law. This 
chapter will address how we can “africanise” the way that Germany deals with the state in 
situations of privatisation and ppp contracts. Chapter four will also evaluate the current 
privatisation process through ppp agreements and the level of accountability that is necessary. 
It will determine how we can enhance accountability measures in ppp agreements to ensure 
14 
compliance in behaviour of state and non-state actors when they enter into ppp contracts. This 
chapter will be punctuated with recommendations around the future legal status of Eskom as a 
parastatal, the enhancement of accountabiliy in ppp agreements and lastly we will conclude. 
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CHAPTER 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PRIVATISATION, AND PPP’S 
2.1 Defining Public-Private-Partnerships 
Contracting out or outsourcing is when a private body is engaged to provide certain goods 
or services to the public, whereas deregulation is when an activity or industry is released from 
certain legislative controls and constraints that were previously imposed on them or at the very 
least relaxing them. The other privatisation option is that of public-private partnerships between 
the government and a private entity. This form of privatisation is the one which we will focus 
on in this dissertation as well as its influence on the public/private divide. The questions the 
paper seeks to address are; in light of this inevitable move towards privatisation, administrative 
law cannot help but be concerned about certain issues that it raises for the current structure of 
administrative law as there is an element of public interest entangled in the entire concept of 
the provision of services by the private sector to the public. The public are heavily reliant on 
basic services like water and electricity, and the state is under a public law duty to provide these 
services and to do so in an equitable way. The issue that we face however is that privatisation 
has the effect of making citizens become consumers who unwittingly and without a choice get 
into a private law type relationship with the provider of the service. 
The South African Treasury Regulation13 defines PPPs as a contract between a 
government institution and a private party, in which the private party performs an institutional 
function or uses state property in terms of output specifications, and substantial financial, 
technical and operational risk is transferred to the private party, which benefits through unitary 
payment from government budget and user fees.14 This definition confines itself to contractual 
commitments between the public and private party when the risk is transferred. An argument 
has been advanced that the regulation fails to specify the degree of risk that is being transferred 
                                                             
13 No. 16 of 2004. 
14 Ibid. 
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as well as to encapsulate elements such as trust, mutual commitment, or social and community 
obligations which are necessary for accountability considerations in the definition of PPPs.15 
Evidence points to the success of PPPs where commitment and trust form the basis of the 
relationship between the government and the participating enterprise.16  
Bovaird17 argues that it is important to understand the role of accountability in PPPs, as 
accountability incorporates the concepts of mutual commitment and captures the notion of trust 
as envisioned by the Treasury Regulation. He defines PPPs as working arrangements premised 
on mutual commitment over and above that which is implied in the contract between public 
sector organisations with any organisation outside of the public sector. Thus, reading these two 
definitions together, PPPs for the purposes of this dissertation will be considered to be long-
term contractual relationships between public and private partners where there is a 
manifestation of mutual commitment and trust in which risks, rewards, resources, skills, 
expertise and finance are shared. Bringing Eskom into this realm is desirable and likely to enjoy 
a certain degree of success. 
Dealing with PPPs necessitates the assessment of their procurement and the overarching 
requirements of transparency and accountability in their procurement as enshrined in S 217(1) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa18 in which it is stated that when an organ of 
state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government or other institution identified in 
the national legislation contracts for goods or services, it must do so in line with a system that 
is fair, equitable, transparent and cost effective.19  
The first question is what room is there for public participation and accountability of 
the sectors involved? The public is overlooked in the entire process and indeed excluded 
                                                             
15 Supra note 2, p. 68.  
16 Rein and Scott, 2009. 
17 Rosenbloom, 2014: p. 72. 
18 1996. 
19 S 217 (1) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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through Eskom’s ability to circumvent the democratic and constitutionally mandated body, 
National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), when it attempts to get approval for its 
plans without those plans being subjected to independent critical review.20 Additionally, when 
NERSA is bypassed, it cannot obtain public comment and participation as it has been excluded 
from the decision-making process.21 This leaves no room for public participation and 
accountability of the government and the engineers and managers involved. The exclusion of 
the public and the lack of a way in which to hold the sectors involved accountable flies in the 
face of our idea of democracy and indeed lacks the essence of democratic accountability.22   
Secondly, will the forces of competition achieve adequate levels of fairness and 
individual justice in a country like South Africa whose inequalities sometimes seem 
insurmountable? The forces of competition which are mentioned in the White Paper will 
arguably fail to provide adequate levels of fairness and individual justice in a country like South 
Africa. This argument is made by Farlam23 who advances the view that privatisation of 
electricity supply does not enjoy as much success as privatisation of other state-owned 
enterprises such as airlines or telecommunications. The cause for this is the necessary monopoly 
of electricity transmission.24 Single lines for transmission transfer electricity from a power 
station to thousands of consumers. It would make no sense and would be even wasteful to 
require that different electricity companies must put up their own transmitter lines. This 
impracticality explains why privatised electricity supply is always highly regulated and usually 
in a complicated way.25 But Eskom is an exception to this rule. It was not as highly regulated 
as its equivalents in other countries which means Eskom is already enjoying the benefits of one 
                                                             
20 Handler J “Down from Bureaucracy: The Ambiguity of Privatisation and Empowerment” (1996) at 2. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Farlam, P. (2005). The South African Institute of International Affairs: Nepad Policy Focus Series 
Working Together Assessing Public Private Partnerships in Africa. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/ investment/investmentfordevelopment/34867724.pdf Last accessed 20 September 
2016. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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of the modes of privatisation, namely deregulation, but without the responsibility of 
accountability, that comes with it. Introducing competition to Eskom, however, is very 
dependent on context. To explain this, it is necessary to look to Germany to explain why the 
significant forces of competition would fail in achieving fairness and individual justice in South 
Africa.  
Germany has a ‘feed-in’ tariff and every so often, calls are made for households with 
small wind turbines or photovoltaic solar panels to sell electricity into the grid.26 The feed-in 
tariffs in Germany and other countries are unfair, in so far as they guarantee the seller a fake 
high price for their electricity even if the seller provides it during off-peak times when there is 
no demand for it.27 This high price is passed on to other electricity consumers.28 The problem 
with this feed-in system is that only the rich people can afford to install the pricey solar systems. 
Consequently, the practical play out of this system is an enhanced transfer of wealth from the 
poor to the rich.29 South Africa has a high proportion of poor people and most people in South 
Africa would not be able to afford to purchase and install the solar panels that are needed for 
this venture. Much like Germany, the system of feeding in would only further serve to enrich 
the already wealthy. Thus, this form of competition would be undesirable and would not serve 
individual justice or fairness to South Africa’s unequal society.  
Other forms of competition, however, may be advanced which may promote the goals 
for individual justice and fairness. One of these other forms could be the introduction of a 
public-private partnership agreement in the electricity industry. Public Enterprises Minister 
Lynne Brown argues that Eskom should not become privatised, it must rather remain state-
owned. The qualification for this, however, is that the State must refrain from interfering in 
                                                             
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Eskom politically.30 The ANC government has failed to adhere to this qualification; instead, it 
has made political appointments and appointments based only on race. The government of the 
day has also made fundamental decisions regarding Eskom with near to no consideration for 
expertise and economic realities. Provided Eskom can function autonomously and without state 
interference, it can remain a state enterprise. If the government’s interference does not cease 
then an argument for the privatisation of Eskom can be made, but since the state is eager to 
interfere it is unlikely to allow privatisation even if on paper, they try to point towards it. This 
is the conundrum in which Eskom now finds itself: it is partially privatised, at least in theory, 
but in reality it is state owned.  
Thus, there is a need to enhance Eskom’s accountability considering that it is performing 
a public function, therefore subject to public law principles, but as the White Paper stated, they 
also operate in a way which has business elements, thus bringing it squarely into the realm of 
private law. Thus, it is necessary to ask what future direction should be taken by an institution 
that can effectively avoid accountability through its partially privatised tenets and business-
related objectives. 
As argued before, Eskom is shrouded in a veil of secrecy and because of this, it 
possesses the monopoly on information required to understand the implications of its 
investments. This is contrary to the spirit and object of s 217 of the Constitution which calls for 
transparency, fairness, equity, competitiveness, cost effectiveness and accountability when an 
organ of state and institution such as Eskom which is identified in national legislation contracts 
for a service of providing electricity. It is evident that Eskom has failed in transparency as they 
insist on secrecy.  
Fairness has not been achieved either, as most appointments are political appointments 
or political favours, thereby overlooking the qualified individuals best suited for the job. 
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Competitiveness is downplayed by not incorporating sufficient and effective competition that 
is suitable for South Africa’s society. It is evident from the crisis at hand of a shortage of 
electricity supply and indeed from the construction of power stations of such proportions as 
Medupi, and the contentious nuclear power plant, that cost-effective means of providing 
electricity is not Eskoms’ top priority.  This will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
How the accountability of Eskom can be enhanced through PPPs and the policies which should 
be introduced to realise the Constitutional objectives of s 217 are issues that will be discussed 
in the following chapters. 
2.2 Main features of privatisation 
Under privatisation, the privatisation authority sets out the divestment plan which 
involves the transfer of ownership to the private sector.31 The process of privatisation is laden 
with complex transactions and carefully designed contracts as well as a multi-stage competitive 
tender process.32 In most cases of privatisation, the public sector will withdraw entirely from 
the management of the privatising entity in question.33 Thus leaving all risks to be borne by the 
private sector.34  
Therefore, from the above outline, it is clear that the criterion employed in the choosing 
of the private party in PPPs are complex and do not simply look at the best price and the extent 
of conformity to the technical specifications.35 PPPs place significant weight on the actual 
delivery phase of the project such as the provision of electricity for example. PPPs strive for an 
open relationship where businesses are encouraged to propose alternatives rather than being 
dictated to under the traditional version of procurement.36 This calls for the private party to 
carefully design the best solution in line with the government specifications, while at the same 
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time offering technical and financial arrangements for the project and lastly to bear the 
accompanying operational risks.37 
The privatisation of previously public utilities, more especially those which enjoy a 
monopoly in their industry, usually takes place in a strictly regulated environment which can 
impose detailed service and investment obligations such as rollout schedules to rural areas, or 
price caps to poor consumers.38 The failure to effectively regulate the privatisation process and 
to set up subsequent regulators to control prices and to require companies to extend services in 
poor areas has often led to numerous privatisation attempts resulting in a royal flop.39  
The supposed benefits and efficiency gains that are associated with PPPs should not, 
however, be taken for granted and in this spirit, Peter Dwyer argues that the justifications for 
privatisation which are based on the generalisation of the stereotype that “public sector bad and 
private sector good” should not become a presumption.40 Businesses and governments argue 
that the private sector bristles with dynamism, creativity and in a word, entrepreneurialism, 
unlike the ‘corrupt’, ‘lazy’, ‘strike prone’ workers in the public sector. Moreover, research from 
the UK, where PPP-PFI (Private Finance Initiative) was devised, shows that cost savings 
achieved by private companies taking over public services come through cutting the terms and 
conditions of staff employed in the services.41 He further argues that privatisation prioritises 
profit over individuals and this constitutes another way in which basic services become 
commoditised.  
The worldwide confederation of public service trade unions42 criticism of PPPs focuses 
on issues of accountability, transparency, erosion of employees’ rights, the undermining of the 
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power of trade unions and a general mistrust of private sector participation.43 The Nepad Policy 
Focus paper argues that many organisations such as the Public Service International (PSI) argue 
that the attempt to distinguish PPPs from privatisation creates a distinction with no difference 
because the state transfers the responsibility to the private sector which alters the previously 
agreed upon levels of services, price or employment.44 Yet in spite of this, one cannot ignore 
the evident problems that governments have with delivering good quality service at competent 
prices.45 Jerome has set out a list of reasons detailing the cause of failure for government-owned 
utilities, some of the reasons set out in that list are low productivity, poor service quality, long 
queues and large portions of the population who have no access to basic services, lack of 
transparency and last but certainly not least is the ever looming problem of political interference 
in the operations of these infrastructure entities.46  
The electricity industry has not been immune to these problems and much like other 
governments, South Africa was not immune to giving in to populist pressures to keep the prices 
of electricity low, not taking into account that the poor were not benefitting from the provided 
subsidies.47 The failure of the government to meet the basic demands of citizens resulted in a 
birth of black markets for connections and a habit of stealing electricity and then giving it away 
to employees and government officials, soliciting bribes to move customers to the head of the 
queue.48 Nigeria provides a comparative example of the manifestation of this. In 1993 a report 
on Nigeria’s electricity sector was released which pointed out that: 
All the major, government-owned domestic energy facilities … are incurring huge 
financial losses … causing major losses to the economy through frequent supply 
interruptions. At the core of the poor performance of these enterprises are 
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inappropriate investment strategies … politically motivated interference by the 
government in enterprise management; grossly inadequate, regulated prices for 
outputs …; poor enterprise management; lack of maintenance and poor operational 
practices; inadequate compensation levels for mid-level staff; and government-
mandated gross over-staffing.49 
 
South Africa is not exempt from this above argument and its practical play out is best seen in 
the case study of Eskom, to be discussed later. In 1998 due to the shortage of electricity supply 
in South Africa, the national electricity supply commission, Eskom, launched a series of load 
shedding phases which according to the deputy director-general in the Department of Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), Rudi Dicks,50 have been estimated to have cost the 
country an amount of 11 billion rand per month. Not to mention that Eskom had been asking 
for government rescue and intervention because they were struggling financially. This struggle 
may well be attributed to the politically motivated government interference in Eskom's 
enterprise management, poor enterprise management, lack of maintenance and poor operational 
practices and inappropriate investment strategies much like the one that the second strongest 
economy in Africa, Nigeria, suffered. The reality of the notion argued by Harris above, about 
Nigeria’s energy issues, affected South Africa in a similar fashion as argued in our preceding 
chapter. The crux of the argument was that when the African National Congress (ANC) took 
over from the previous government Eskom was bound to be affected by this change. The first 
of these changes being race-based affirmative action, political interference and political 
appointments.51 Eskom’s primary objective is to provide electricity, among numerous other 
political and ideological objectives.52  This has caused the economy of South Africa to suffer 
huge losses, as will be discussed later. 
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The Nepad Policy Focus paper53 set out numerous case studies which were 
representatives of samples of PPPs that have been initiated in Africa over the last couple of 
years.54 These case studies set out some of the issues that plagued PPPs in various sectors one 
of which was the power sector. The paper argues that between 1990 and 2001 the power sector 
ranked second in investments and third in the number of projects in respect of private sector 
involvement in utility-related infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa.55 During this time, twenty-
two countries incorporated public-private participation modes in electricity and these countries 
awarded twenty-nine stand-alone electricity projects involving water and electricity services.56 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be on two case studies provided by the 
Nepad Policy Focus paper. The first case study will look at Gabon and the multi-utility 
provision system there as well as the lessons that South Africa can learn from it. The second 
case study will look at the power purchasing agreement in Tanzania and the reasons for why it 
has been termed ‘public-private partnership at its worst.’57 
The main hurdle of any state-owned enterprise is allowing political interference, Eskom 
had however managed to escape this curse from 1923-1994. Eskom had a simple mandate; to 
produce sufficient electricity. To this end, it was unencumbered by heavy regulation, unlike its 
counterparts in the United States and Europe. Eskom could best be described as an autonomous 
organisation, run by technocrats. Engineers were in charge and their appointment was based 
entirely on merit; furthermore, Eskom was self-financing and there were no state subsidies for 
electricity.  
In 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) took over the government of South 
Africa and changes began to take place in Eskom. The first of these changes was race-based 
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affirmative action, political interference and political appointments (which although some were 
undesirable, were very predictable).58 To the previous single-minded objective of Eskom, to 
provide electricity, were added numerous political and ideological objectives.59 Soon after the 
ANC came into power, talks about privatising Eskom emerged. In 1998 the government ordered 
Eskom to no longer build new power stations.60 These new directives were found to be 
confusing, unclear and lacked consistency and clarity. Thus in 2004, the Government reversed 
its initial decision to cease the building of new power stations and instead embarked on an 
urgent process of power station construction. This construction was poorly thought out and the 
contracting out was hasty and often ill-considered. The incompetence of Eskom coupled with 
a political agenda led to Eskom terminating their existing established contracts with big coal 
mines and they instead began to purchase coal from various small black-owned mines. This 
was done for reasons of racially-preferential procurement. This admirable but ultimately 
doomed effort was further compounded by Eskom’s decision to reduce coal stockpiles at power 
stations to save on stock costs, but when the rain came, the poor-quality coal got wet and turned 
to slush.61 
In 1998 the Department of Energy published its White Paper on Energy, in which it 
stated that its aim was to clarify government policy regarding the supply and consumption of 
energy for the next decade, which was a welcome intervention. In its vision for the supply of 
electricity industry, it stated that:62 Electricity supply throughout the world is undergoing a 
revolution. This is being caused mainly, but not solely, by electricity utilities having to meet 
new pressures resulting from global markets and governments opening their countries to foreign 
investors to help fund power sector expansion and development. As a result, utilities have had 
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to see themselves as businesses and act accordingly. South Africa is not immune from these 
forces and will have to move broadly in line with developments taking place in the rest of the 
world, while also ensuring that the industry’s evolution meets South Africa’s special 
requirements.63 
It has been argued that the confusion demonstrated in the arguments in the White Paper, 
resulted in a disturbing confusion of policy on electricity supply for the next six years.64 
Contrary to what the Government had said in its White Paper, it seemed to give in to the allure 
of an idea of private electricity supply but was not willing to explore the commitment and 
coherency that would be needed for this idea to work in reality.65 More fateful was the line 
relating to “utilities having to see themselves as businesses.”66  
The White Paper further stated that “to ensure the success of the electricity supply 
industry as a whole, various developments will have to be considered by government over time, 
namely: giving customers the right to choose their electricity supplier; introducing competition 
into the industry, especially the generation sector, permitting open and non-discriminatory 
access to the transmission system; and lastly encouraging private sector participation in the 
industry.”67 All these aspirations and ideas are noble and in fact, they seem to point in the 
direction of privatisation and going further by giving the consumer the right to choose who their 
provider is, thereby giving the consumer an effective private law remedy against the provider 
of the utility should an issue arise. This right to choose your provider eliminates one of the main 
issues that was pointed out by a commentator who had argued that the relabeling of public 
activities as private would play out in reality with the government insulated from scrutiny due 
to the use of the rhetoric of freedom to contract, and the consumer not being able to choose their 
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provider, and thus stripped of any sort of private law remedy.68 Secondly, the idea of 
introducing competition into the industry was proposed. This would have averted the second 
blow that privatisation could pose, essentially that newly privatised entities often operate as 
monopolies.69  
Without competition, privatisation often results in an increase in the cost of services and 
this necessarily means that low-income earners become vulnerable to unilateral action by the 
utility monopoly in question.70 With these main disadvantages of privatisation seemingly 
eliminated, the idea of Eskom becoming privatised became even more attractive. Sound as these 
above proposals were, however, the government neglected to consider the most important issue 
which was that South Africa was fast running out of electricity. The questions of how to price 
electricity, plan future electricity supply, frame electricity policy in order to ensure that one can 
get constant, reliable and affordable electricity at all times, went unanswered and indeed not 
even asked.71 In keeping with the ideas that had been stated in the White Paper, the government 
kept the price of electricity supply artificially low for social and political reasons, and because 
the price was so low, no private power producer was interested in entering the supply market.72 
Furthermore, the policies that the government had introduced on privatisation were vague and 
strongly opposed by trade unions and communist allies.73 Thus no privatisation took place and 
no power stations were built until after 2004 when the policy was changed, but by then it was 
too late to avoid the ensuing electricity crisis. This unfolding of events has resulted in the crisis 
in which South Africa currently finds itself asking where things went wrong.  
The biggest mistake that was made is perhaps best articulated by Grove Steyn who 
argues that technological paradigms and construction choices and the lack of demand-side 
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strategies serve the interests of engineers, managers and politicians at the expense of society.74 
The interests of these groups are often not sufficiently aligned with the interests of society.75 
Managers have often overinvested in certain risky ventures such as mega power stations with 
new and unproven technology due to the prestige and pecuniary benefits rather than following 
more reliable and incremental technology and investment strategies that can respond to 
unforeseen contingencies.76 Managers greatly benefit from upside results and they can 
effectively avoid the downside risk by passing the extra cost on to the unsuspecting consumer. 
With the long period of surplus electricity supply since the late 1980’s, lulling the Eskom 
managers into a false sense of security, they began to pursue their fortunes elsewhere.77 Fuelled 
by this false sense of security they began to venture out with Eskom Enterprises, pursuing 
unproven telecommunication technologies and driving one of the most expensive and highly 
speculative Pebble Bed Modular Reactor projects which were essentially an alliance between 
rent greedy engineers and misguided politicians.78  
In the process, they overlooked the growing problem of reliability of electricity supply. 
This behaviour went unabated, why? Economists have labelled this issue as a problem of 
information asymmetry. Eskom operates under uncommon and unfounded conditions of 
secrecy and this gives them a monopoly in the information required for the understanding of 
the implications of its investments and choices of technology.79 In principle, it is possible that 
independent analysts and the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) could 
provide reviews of Eskom’s plans.80 Eskom Generation planners have however been able to 
bypass NERSA and get direct Cabinet approval for the plans without them being subjected to 
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independent critical review.81 This ability to bypass the democratic institution in place to review 
the decisions made by Eskom lacks a large degree of democratic accountability.82 Eskom should 
be obligated to give detailed information relating to its investment plans and Cabinet should 
utilise NERSA and request it to obtain public comment and give independent reviews of 
Eskom’s proposals.83 Thus a much greater role for private sector participation is possible and 
indeed desirable, through effective and well-regulated privatisation policies. With this 
obligation, Eskom should further be forced to purchase power from any producer that is willing 
to sell it at a sufficient price.84  
2.3 Breaking down the PPP definition  
In the first chapter, the definition of PPPs was characterised as a contract between a 
public-sector institution and a private party, where the latter takes over a large portion of the 
financial, technical and operational risk in the designing, financing, building and operation of 
the project in question.85 In this chapter, the definition of PPPs will be explored further and 
broken down to get a better view of the concept. With over fifty partnerships either in the 
development or implementation phase at both national and provincial level and three hundred 
projects at the municipal level, since 1994, South Africa has acquired much more experience 
of PPPs in Africa than all its counterparts.86  The South African National Treasury Ministry‘s 
role is to assess the viability of and approve PPP agreements.87 This Ministry has accordingly 
developed the PPP Manual and Standardised PPP Provisions to guide all projects that are PPP 
in nature.88 
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The Manual for PPPs states that there are two types of PPPs, the first one is where the 
private party performs a function which is ordinarily carried out by government and the second 
one may be where the private party obtains the use of state property for its own uses, 
alternatively there may also be an amalgam of these two.89  
The remuneration for the exchange of benefits and obligations may involve the 
government paying the private party for the delivery of the service or the private party collecting 
fees or charges from the people using the service or a combination of the above two.90 Thus the 
content of the partnership, which entails securing a long-term mutual commitment between the 
public sector and private party to share costs, rewards and risks of the project, distinguishes it 
in many ways from the traditional public procurement that has become customary and to the 
conventional privatisation path considered over the years.91 The key differences between these 
three are that public procurement is a once-off transaction where the government acquires goods 
or services from a private party, whereas privatisation usually entails the sale of an asset by the 
government to the private party for the latter’s commercial purposes.92 Thus it has been argued 
that PPPs follow a continuum, ranging from public to private nodes and needs, as they 
incorporate normative but distinctive functions of society which are, on the one hand, the 
market and on the other hand the public duty owed to the electorate by the elected.93 The 
manifestation of this, in reality, is that privatisation and PPPs are on a continuum that is 
characterized by the degree of service obligations imposed and the eventual ownership of the 
asset.94 The challenge, of course, is that the PPP permits such vacillations while at the same 
time reinforces the desired partnership without weakening the other sector.95  
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2.4 Legislation and policies on PPPs in South Africa 
Several scholars have argued that various laws96 and policies97 governing PPPs in South 
Africa stress accountability and transparency as well as a consideration of factors such as value 
for money in the procurement of goods and services. The existence, however, of these 
legislative manuals has failed to control the challenges and concerns that have emerged. One 
of the main concerns is that these pieces of legislation are cumbersome and complex, which 
breeds a culture of rule-bending and fosters the use of corrupt means to avoid the rules. The 
past few years have revealed a slow roll-out of PPPs, with various partnerships taking shape 
but each doing so outside the parameters of the PPP legislation and policies, with some strictly 
adhering to boundaries within the law.98 There have been two PPPs rolled out per year at both 
national and provincial level since 2004, and the entire process from initiation to procurement 
is arduous and lengthy, taking between 24 to 36 months. This slow start may be attributed to 
the complex legislation and policies.99 A further concern is that the legislation and policies fail 
to protect the legitimate interests of all stakeholders in nurturing partnerships. It is argued that 
there is little participation from citizens and other affected stakeholders from the initiation phase 
through to the procurement stage.  
 
2.5 South African privatisation 
South Africa’s move towards privatisation has been necessary albeit marred by doubts 
and hesitation.100 The introduction of privatisation has meant that government’s contract out 
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some of the functions which were previously in their exclusive domain to the private sector.101 
The current benefactor state is premised on the idea that a duty rests on the government to 
provide certain basic services and benefits, but these ideas have had to be adapted to more 
modern desires.102 Salient among these desires is that for efficiency.103 This desire has 
accelerated the move towards privatisation, as privatisation is the fastest way to achieving the 
goal of efficiency.  
After World War II with the need to restore war-torn economies in Europe, governments 
had to adopt the functions of corporations that were previously private entities to ensure that 
citizens were all provided with basic services and benefits, which meant that these functions 
became public. To carry these functions out, public power had to be employed. In the aftermath 
of the war, governments and people had one thing echoing in all their minds: that never again, 
should people and governments find themselves in the situation that the war had left them in; 
economically unstable, lacking food, poor infrastructure, poor access to basic services such as 
water and electricity etc. This deep desire to avoid repeating history ushered in the phenomenon 
of massive states whose key concerns were welfare and security.104 The issue was, however, 
that this massive state was seen to be a waste of resources and inefficient at delivering 
services.105 This was a worldwide issue in Europe, the United States and even in Third World 
countries such as South Africa.106 Governments attempted to minimise their presence and direct 
involvement (more especially in economies) and to rely more on the private sector through 
private markets. In the Western democracies, the common threads of privatisation are now seen 
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as reducing the role of national government, minimising public spending, reducing the direct 
provision of services and ultimately less intervention in the lives of citizens.107 
Eskom was established by the South African Government in 1923 under the 1922 
Electricity Act and its Afrikaans name was Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie.108 In 1986 the 
two names were combined as Eskom.109 Eskom was an entirely state-owned company mandated 
to supply electricity. In short, it has been shown that privatisation at the national level in South 
Africa has not stopped post-1994 (Eskom, the steel industry, Transnet, which includes the ports, 
Telkom etc.). The state essentially commercialised the undertaking by stressing profit rather 
than service, and then reached full privatisation, where the asset was sold and listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and changed ownership.  One may ask then what the link is 
between privatisation and administrative law and what privatisation has to do with 
administrative law. 
Some of the arguments advanced in favour of privatisation are that privatisation is likely 
to boost competition because of the need for private entities to provide efficient delivery of 
services but at the same time decreasing the cost of the service to the consumer. The second 
benefit is that of enhanced accountability of service providers. These arguments are all 
encapsulated in one chief argument, which holds that privatisation provides a healthy 
disciplinary effect of competition. The reasons advanced in favour of this argument are that 
privatised entities have to fight for market share with other commercial enterprises which is 
desirable for efficient delivery of goods and services and for the consumers’ bank balances. 
Another reason in support of privatisation is that the private sector will be released from the 
bureaucratic constraints on their commercial judgement and that methods of political 
accountability will be substituted by accountability to shareholders.110  
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While there are numerous models of privatisation such as outsourcing, deregulation and 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) which may be the mode by which to achieve the above 
arguments in favour of privatisation, this dissertation will only focus on PPPs. Privatisation is 
often used to denote the selling by the government of its assets such as electricity through 
Eskom, rail transportation through Transnet or telecommunications through Telkom.111 But 
privatisation can also mean the transfer of regulatory control from the public sphere to the 
private sector.112  
South Africa has indicated an interest in increasing the value of commitment to 
infrastructure development through public-private partnerships (PPPs) and with this an 
increased attention to issues concerning the accountability of PPPs as alternative developmental 
projects.113 PPPs have become the alternative way to traditional public procurement to achieve 
efficient service delivery arrangements and to enhance cost-effectiveness and service delivery 
through accountability.114 The importance of accountability in PPPs includes keeping proper 
financial records, performance outcomes, programme effectiveness, efficiency and establishing 
expectations.115 Considering these attractive advantages to privatisation and PPPs, there is an 
equally strong argument that the inclination towards shared accountability in PPPs results in 
joint ‘irresponsibility“, with no one being accountable.116 This issue of joint irresponsibility is 
best illustrated by our electricity utility company Eskom, initially established as the Electricity 
Supply Commission (Escom).117 
The function of providing electricity to the public is the responsibility of the 
government. In recent years, policy has been introduced, as shown in documents such as the 
White Paper, which attempted to introduce clear regulatory reforms of Eskom into a private 
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entity. The intention to privatise Eskom failed due to incoherence and a lack of clarity. Based 
on such incoherence and lack of clarity, it can be concluded that Eskom is not a wholly 
privatised entity but neither is it an entirely public entity. Rather, it is in a transitory or semi-
privatised phase. How should administrative law respond to the shifting of public functions and 
the exercise of public powers through private law vehicles?  
In the above brief introduction of Eskom and its history, it is clear that the function of 
providing electricity to society was public and to this end, Eskom was untainted by political 
favours, political nominations and rent seeking engineers.118 The employees of Eskom were 
employed based purely on merit.119 Post-1994 this position changed, the change was a one-
hundred-and-eighty-degree turn, which plunged the electricity supply industry into an alarming 
state of confusion.120 The electricity supply industry now finds itself led by people who were 
politically appointed and Eskom is run by engineers who are essentially investors who are out 
to advance their own interests, which interests are not in line with the interests of society in 
general.  
Thus, the different interest groups can be considered part of an element of ‘business,’ in 
which profits are the primary objective. Eskom is shrouded in a cloud of confusion because of 
their forgotten mandate, to provide sufficient electricity, and this confusion is intensified by 
political appointments, the need for the managers and engineers of Eskom to make profit hand 
over fist. Here it is evident that the public function that Eskom has to carry out is to provide 
sufficient electricity, the public power utilised to ensure that this mandate is satisfied is the 
elected government who should appoint people qualified to help in the achievement of their 
mandate. The elected government delegates the power to carry out the mandate to people in 
exchange for political favours; moreover, these same people are woefully underqualified to be 
dealing with this matter. Then, it is clear that the introduction of the private sector through 
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engineers and managers who are eager to make investments using Eskom’s free cash flow. With 
this there is a clear illustration of a shift of public functions, to provide electricity and the 
exercise of public powers, to appoint people to carry out this function, through private law 
vehicles such as contracts with black owned small mining companies for coal, investment 
schemes made by engineers and managers who are in it for the advancement of their own 
interests. To establish a context for the rest of the dissertation, a brief discussion of the problem 
statements will be discussed. 
2.6 Privatisation in the context of ESKOM 
According to Hoexter, despite the fact that governments should be liable for the exercise 
of public power, the private sector must be free to explore and enjoy their economic and social 
interests in the absence of government interference.121 This distinction strongly endorses a 
division between the public and the private spheres, which ultimately undermines the traditional 
definition of the state. Schreiner JA’s ratio expresses this attitude succinctly in the case of 
Mustapha v Receiver of Revenue122 where he holds that for better or worse a private owner may 
exercise their rights to their property in whichever way they please to the exclusion of all; the 
Minister, however, or a public servant, has no such luxury. A public servant has to exercise his 
powers within the limitations of the statute which expressly or implicitly bestowed the power 
on him.123 If the exercise of his power is subsequently challenged the court must interpret the 
provision under question including its implications as well as any lawfully enacted regulations 
to examine whether the powers have been duly exercised.124 The case of Mustapha is a pre-
Constitution case, which does not make it bad law, but the attitude it expresses is not a tenable 
one in our contemporary society as the previously strong defining line between the state and 
the private sector has become difficult to recognise. The difficulty stems from the reality that 
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states are increasingly engaging in entrepreneurial activities and private sector companies are 
becoming international conglomerates with far-reaching powers, making these companies akin 
to private governments.125  
A counter argument to the one above (that one can no longer point out where the acts 
of the state start and end and where the acts of the private sector start) is expressed by 
Hutchison.126 He argues that one cannot differentiate between public and private power as the 
state is connected to all activity that occurs within its borders.127 Nevertheless, there can be no 
doubt that the labelling ‘private,’ makes the life of any organisation much easier to the extent 
that judicial approaches which emphasise the differences between public and private powers 
may end up protecting private power used for public purposes.128 A commentator encapsulates 
the main argument of this dissertation in saying that the relabeling of public activities as private 
and then using principles of contract, such as privity of contract, ends up insulating the 
government from scrutiny.129  
When one recognises that private entities have power and relative immunity as they are 
private, it becomes clear why the judiciary is so eager to fill the gaping accountability vacuum 
by applying judicial review to non-statutory bodies in cases where powers have had elements 
of a public nature.130 The way in which privatisation manifests, in reality, is that a consumer 
has no private remedy against a “private” provider of an essential service such as electricity as 
the consumer has no choice at the end of the day as to who provides the service. Thus, an 
affected consumer will have no contractual remedy against the provider as the contract is 
between the government and the private provider. It goes without saying that the provider may 
in any event not be able to meet delictual actions more especially if these are widespread. This 
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already bad state of affairs is worsened by newly privatised entities which operate as 
monopolies such as Eskom. In the absence of viable competition, partial privatisation of entities 
like Eskom results in an increase in the cost of services, this in turn negatively impacts low-
income earners who become more susceptible to unilateral actions such as the discontinuation 
of services without warning, especially in rural areas.131  
2.7 Privatisation in the constitutional dispensation 
The constitutional dispensation countenanced a clear recognition of privatisation as a 
way to allow private institutions to perform public functions through s 217 of the 
Constitution.132 In AAA Investments133 Yacoob J held that our Constitution, much like Canada’s 
and the United States constitutions, ensures that government is not released from its human 
rights and rule of law obligations when it delegates its functions to another entity. Furthermore, 
an entity in South African Law does not have to be part of the government to be bound by the 
Constitution. In this regard, a discussion of s 8 of the Constitution will be of particular 
significance in the course of the dissertation as well as the discourse relating to the organs of 
state and the relevance of state control. As stated above one of the other ways in which 
privatisation occurs is through public-private partnerships.  
The new legal phenomenon of PPPs has emerged because of privatisation. It is this 
phenomenon on which this dissertation will focus. Public-private partnerships have become 
increasingly popular worldwide in the governments’ fight against funding problems, public 
inefficiency and waste, and as an integral way to improve deeply ingrained socio-economic, 
political, fiscal and societal problems. Thus, it comes as no surprise that South Africa has joined 
in resorting to privatisation and consequently PPPs, albeit hesitantly. This dissertation will 
provide various definitions of PPPs to illustrate that PPPs are essentially long-term contracts 
between the government and the private sector, in which there is an enjoyment of commitment 
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and trust, and where risk, reward, resources, skills, expertise and finance are shared. PPPs are 
fundamental to developing economies such as South Africa, but the reasons provided in support 
of PPPs as a viable solution to service-delivery fail to provide comfort in light of the other 
doubts as to the effectiveness of accountability and the notion that PPPs may undermine public 
control. Given that accountability is one of the cornerstones of administrative law in South 
Africa, it is essential that accountability in PPPs is enhanced by looking to comparative 
jurisdictions and through engaging in creative policy-making.  
2.8  Relevant South African legislation  
2.8.1 The National Energy Act 34 of 2008 
Section 2 of the National Energy Act (the NEA) states that its object, among others, is 
to ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy to the nation and facilitate energy access to improve 
the quality of life of the people of South Africa.134 The emphasis here, for the purpose of this 
dissertation, is on access. 
Section 5(1) of the NEA states that the Minister must adopt measures that provide for 
universal access to appropriate forms of energy, or energy services, to the citizens of South 
Africa at affordable prices.135 Section 5(2) states that the access referred to in section 5(1) is 
subject to, amongst other things, the availability of energy resources and whether the authority 
in question can afford such resources. 
Section 6 provides that the Minister must develop and, on an annual basis, review and 
publish the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) in the Gazette.136 The IEP must deal with issues 
relating to the supply, storage of and demand for energy in a way that accounts for economically 
available energy resources, universal accessibility and free basic electricity.137 Essentially, this 
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means that the government needs to develop ways to increase access to energy and, if possible, 
access to free electricity. The focus now shifts to the IEP and other legislation to see if they 
create a duty on government to supply free basic electricity.138 
 2.8.2 The Draft 2012 Integrated Energy Planning Report: Executive Summary (IEPR)139 
One of the IEPR’s objectives is a plan to increase access to energy and it states that 
“energy access is now widely recognised as a prerequisite for human development.”140 It is 
noteworthy that access to energy, as has been cited by the NEA, is said to be a function of 
availability and affordability. In effect, access to energy is something that is progressively 
realised and the supply thereof is subject to the availability of resources in order to be 
facilitated.141 This means that if resources such as money, infrastructure or even physical 
resources such as coal are not available, then access to energy and free basic electricity cannot 
be provided to the people in areas affected by scarce resources.  
 
2.8.3 The Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (MSA) 
There is, therefore, no law which places a duty on national or provincial government to 
provide free basic electricity. But what about local government? Section 73(1)(a) of the MSA 
states that a municipality must give effect to the provisions of the Constitution and give priority 
to the basic needs of the local community. It also states that municipal services must be provided 
in a manner that is conducive to the prudent, economic, efficient and effective use of available 
resources (s 73(2) (b) (i)). Therefore, just as at a national and provincial level, if electricity is 
not available or there is no budget to pay for it, there too can be no free basic electricity provided 
to the people in affected local areas.142   
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2.8..4 The Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff (Free Basic Electricity) Policy143 
The Free Basic Electricity Policy of 2003 states that certain groups of people who meet 
specific criteria qualify for the allocation of free basic electricity, which is limited to a 
maximum of 60kWh per household, per month and anything over this limit will be charged to 
the customer. There are two possible methods of assessing who qualifies for free electricity: (1) 
that the ‘poor households’ apply for a limited electricity supply which makes them eligible for 
a free basic electricity allocation; or (2) that the responsible electricity service provider 
identifies households consuming, on average, less than a pre-determined amount of electricity 
per month and then automatically applies the free basic electricity allocation. Essentially, free 
basic electricity should be provided but only by municipalities that can afford it and have 
adequate resources to supply it.144 Thus, the responsibility of local government is to provide 
access to electricity and not necessarily to provide free electricity unless it can afford to. 
There is a need for the State and the private service providers to address human rights 
concerns before, during and after the privatisation process to ensure that everyone has been and 
is treated fairly. The provision of electricity through Eskom has been chosen as a case study 
because electricity has become an integral part of everyone’s life in South Africa but it is also 
a limited and expensive resource. That being said, electricity has become a pre-requisite for the 
realisation and enjoyment of other human rights and is a public good fundamental for life and 
health. Although South Africa has had an impressive growth in building democratic institutions 
and respect for human rights, income inequalities, with a large portion of the population living 
below the poverty line, meaning that many people are dependent on the government for the 
realisation and protection of their basic services such as electricity. The findings of this paper 
will reflect what is happening in South Africa and other developing countries about the 
privatisation of public utilities.  
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2.9 Case study examples from other African countries 
 2.9.1 Multi-Utility Provision in Gabon  
In July 1997 Societe d’Energie et d’Eau du Gabon (SEEG), a company that is majority 
owned by Vivendi  Water, which is a French multinational corporation, entered into a twenty-
year concession agreement with the government of Gabon, to provide water and electricity 
services.145 SEEG derived from multiple private municipal companies that were already 
providing water and electricity to Gabon’s two main urban metros, Libreville and Port-
Gentil.146 These two urban centres together constituted half of Gabon's total population of just 
over a million people. The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)147 released 
a report in which they had found evidence to support the notion that the concession had been a 
success and that this was mainly due to the strong political commitment from the 
government.148 The reason for this claim seems to have stemmed from the provisions of the 
contract between the parties which obligated SEEG to invest a minimum of $135 million for 
rehabilitation (60% in water), this included coverage targets for expanding services to 
previously unconnected rural areas.149 It was also found in the study that SEEG’s electricity 
business, more especially their electricity revenues from the two main towns, served to cross-
subsidise the less developed water business. Vivendi won the tender based on a proposed 
17.25% price reduction for water and electricity services.150 The PPIAF report states that the 
private operator enjoyed a degree of success in the first five years in its existing service areas, 
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often going above and beyond the goals it had set.151 The report also noted that less progress 
had been achieved in the more isolated areas. SEEG had made good profits since it began its 
operations and it had paid its shareholders a 20% dividend per share in 2000.152 Furthermore, 
coverage targets were put in place with penalties for non-achievement and incentives for a 
speedy increase in network density in newly served areas.153 The multi-utility service in Gabon 
enabled cost reduction through the sharing of resources, particularly at headquarter level.154 
The lessons to be learned from the multi-utility provision in Gabon, are that a long process of 
preparation including major structural reforms is very crucial.155 Secondly, that transparency is 
of the utmost importance during the entire process from inception to execution.156 It was also 
seen that the provisions of the contract were the main drivers of the success of the multi-utility 
provision in Gabon, thus it is worth allocating sufficient time for negotiating parts of the 
contract during the transition period in the concession.157  
However, a comprehensive agreement, realistic deadlines and safeguards to allow 
contract regulation are essential. 158 Another lesson to be learned from Gabon is that granting 
exclusivity to the main operator may result in the exclusion of small-scale operators who may 
be able to contribute to the expansion of services in certain areas.159 Furthermore that by 
defining investment obligations, one limits the investment risk of the private operator.160 The 
last lesson from this initiative is that regional coverage obligations with significant penalties 
may assist in the extension of services in rural areas, but these coverage obligations should not 
be too onerous and complex to assess.161  
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Although Gabon has found a way to successfully implement a public-private agreement 
and has indeed enjoyed a lot of success from it, it is important to point out that Gabon is by no 
means a sufficient measure of standard to South Africa due to the size of the country and indeed 
the population size of the country which does not compare to South Africa’s 55 odd million in 
comparison to Gabon’s mere 1.8 million.162 Moreover, Gabon is not plagued by an influx of 
illegal refugees which makes it very difficult to provide for everyone and indeed results in an 
increase of crime such as theft of electricity because not everyone can be sufficiently provided 
for.  
It goes without saying that South Africa’s land area space is also much more vast and 
large than Gabon’s, which makes it even more difficult to reach the entire country’s poor people 
who are often very spread out and even in the mountains where there are hardly roads by which 
to access those areas.  Another point of difference between South Africa and Gabon is that 
SEEG which was the company responsible for the distribution of water and electricity to Gabon 
is a subsidiary of a French private company Vivendi Water. Therefore, they fall in the realm of 
private law. Whereas the equivalent of SEEG’s counterpart in South Africa, is Eskom, who is 
responsible for electricity distribution, is a parastatal, which means they are half public and half 
private.  
Finally, there is a very important difference between SEEG and Eskom's mandates. 
SEEG is mandated to provide services of both water and electricity whereas Eskom’s mandate 
is to only provide electricity. Therefore, Gabon illustrates that PPPs can work in Africa for 
countries that are similar to it in size, population and political environment, but it may not be 
of much assistance to South Africa unless the study were adapted to South Africa’s political 
environment, population and other relevant factors. Thus, even though the Nepad Focus Policy 
Paper has made a comparison of many African countries in the determination of success of 
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initiating and implementing PPPs, this assessment may not prove to be 100% accurate due to 
some of the differences pointed out above between South and Gabon, not to mention all the 
countries in Africa. Considering the argument that political interference may be good in the 
introduction of PPPs, it is of the essence that it be kept to a minimum through creating a 
ministerial department to monitor that the interference stays within reason. Provided that a 
Ministerial department is protected from political interference and has enough financial and 
human resources, it may perform a crucial and desirable regulatory function.163 Many 
developing countries are in the process of reforming their power sectors by unbundling 
government utilities that are responsible for the generation, transmission, distribution and 
retailing.164 These reforms have been limited to the concession of utility management to private 
operators and the introduction of independent power producers, henceforth IPP’s.165 While 
these projects have had notably good results little emphasis has been put on transmission and 
distribution problems, often emphasising the generation part only.166 This problem is 
highlighted in the next case study which was adopted from the Nepad Policy Focus paper.167 
 
2.9.2 Graft Taints Power Purchasing Agreement in Tanzania 
In 1995 the Tanzanian government owned electricity company, Tanesco, along with a 
Malaysian company and a local investor entered into an electricity purchasing agreement with 
Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) for 100MW of electricity from diesel generators 
for a period of 20 years.168 This venture later turned out to be a burden on the country’s 
economy. A commentator argued that the deal was ‘hotly contested by donors and consultants 
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on the grounds of cost, choice of technology, and the projected demand for power.’ In January 
2002 after much local and international conflict regarding the matter, the project was approved. 
In the first year of its operation, the IPTL cost $40 million for capacity payments and functioned 
at a rate less than 10% of its capacity.169 This was followed by heated government debates and 
was met with huge dissatisfaction from the public, more especially because there was alleged 
corrupt payment to government officials.170  
The reasons which have been advanced for IPTL being a bad PPP is owed not only to 
corruption and high costs of electricity but also to the fact that it was approved by two or three 
government officials in the absence of a feasibility study and without due consultation with the 
necessary stakeholders.171 Had Tanesco followed the correct procedure, the government would 
have found that the problem was not in fact inadequate generating capacity but that it was a 
lack of gridlines.172 As a result Tanesco found itself being forced to buy electricity that it did 
not need at a price that was too high in spite of the fact that Tanesco had put plans into place to 
ensure that they had sufficient electricity.173 Consumers in Tanzania are estimated to pay 
between seven and nine cents per unit of electricity provided by Tanesco but the electricity 
from IPTL is said to cost Tanesco over 12 US cents per unit.174 This amount is in excess of the 
statutory costs per month that IPTL charges Tanesco.175  
The Tanzania example teaches us that the importance of a proper feasibility study 
cannot be taken for granted.176 Had a feasibility study been undertaken, it would have 
questioned the need for the Independent Power Producer, on the grounds of cost, value for 
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money, technology and power demand.177 Secondly, the necessary decision makers were not 
present in the decision-making process and necessary approvals were not secured. Moreover, it 
has been argued that IPP deals are susceptible to corruption, especially in the absence of a 
proper bidding process.178 The consequence of entering into a bad PPP deal is that to get out of 
it is very expensive for the government and as a result the government is forced to implement 
them.179 
What can be learned from the case studies of the PPPs in Gabon and Tanzania is that in 
some instances, politics does indeed matter, for example in Gabon, where the involvement and 
presence of government made the PPP between the government and SEEG very successful.180 
Another lesson is that pricing in PPPs is of the utmost importance, and that corruption destroys 
partnerships. It is also very important that risk transfer and risk management is done 
correctly.181 The introduction of a PPP can also foster local economic empowerment. Finally, 
it has been revealed here that there is a need to regulate the private sector and to enforce the 
contracts and that building the capacity of the public and private sectors is fundamental. Such 
lessons are discussed in more detail below. 
2.10 Lessons to be learned from case studies 
2.10.1 Politics matters 
The lesson that politics matters is a debatable one, especially because of the huge 
difference in the circumstantial positioning of the African countries. It has been shown and 
indeed proven that in countries in similar positioning and circumstances as Gabon, politics does 
matter. This lesson however applies best in cases where water supply is the subject of the PPP 
in question. The Nepad paper argues that by increasing the involvement and incorporation of 
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governments into the privatisation process, states will succeed in decreasing the chances of a 
protesting disgruntled people.182 This is because the government will have or at least should 
have worked hard to explain the necessity of PPPs and a public discussion will have been 
conducted with the people well before any “I's” are dotted and “T's” are crossed.183  
Harris184 has argued that the introduction of a private entity to take over the provision of 
infrastructure is admittedly politically challenging. This is attributed to the inevitable 
consequences of this which includes price increases, the fact that the overstaffing of public 
enterprises may lead to job losses and the chance that the companies may be taken over by 
foreign multinationals.185 Added to these concerns is the potential sizeable profits which may 
lead to suspicions of corruption.186 For governments to succeed with PPPs there is a need for 
them to manage their politics of reform by creating consensus for reforms through the education 
of the public and consultative means, as prescribed by the relevant legislative provisions and 
by ensuring transparency during the process in awards and oversight of private infrastructure 
schemes.187 
Harris188 argues that by putting licensing and concession contracts in clear sight of the 
public eye, governments will enable consumers to see how prices and quality of service are to 
be affected, the quality of service they will receive and to enable the public to understand their 
rights and obligations.189 Harris further argues that the introduction of private entities to take 
over the facilitation of infrastructure is not only challenging politically, but it is a relevant lesson 
for the private companies engaging in PPPs too.190 This is best illustrated by an example from 
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Namibia’s electricity case.191 In 1996 the Namibian Ministry of Regional and Local 
Government Housing (MRLGH)  contracted with Northern Electricity to operate a set of state 
owned and state-financed assets in the densely populated area of northern Namibia.192 Northern 
Electricity succeeded in providing electricity and enjoyed profits in an area where the 
government had previously lost N$10 million (ZAR 10 million) per year.193 In 2002 a study 
was conducted by the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) of the World 
Bank and this study found that Northern Electricity succeeded in understanding, anticipating, 
and responding to the needs of their commercial consumers, but they would have been even 
more successful if they had understood, anticipated and responded to the needs of the Town 
Councils who were ultimately the ones to determined their fate. This is seen by Northern 
Electricity’s failure to secure a renewal of their contract, which was awarded to a joint venture 
between the national utility company NamPower and other local regional governments. The 
study concluded that when ‘politics is understood as characterising a particular allocation of 
benefits among competing interest groups, then private companies are advised to pay attention’. 
Thus, it is evident that having a political backer can be the determinate of whether you fail or 
succeed as a PPP.  
Another reason to worry that politics is a significant role player in the success or failure 
of a PPP is stated by Juliet Kairuki,194 who is a PPP project manager at the SADC Banking 
Association. She argues that most of the PPP projects that have enjoyed success in Africa (more 
especially in countries with little to no regulatory and legal frameworks) have had a common 
element of involvement of senior political bodies which served as an indicator of a guarantee 
and commitment to investors who desired good returns on their investment.195  An example of 
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a PPP in South Africa,  which has succeeded as a result of having a political champion, is the 
N4 toll road which was promoted by the then Premier of Mpumalanga, Mathews Phosa.196 The 
flip side however, of this argument for increased political involvement is that, when there is 
political involvement in a PPP agreement, it has to be accompanied by a transparent and open 
process that removes any suspicion of corruption. In 2003, Mac Maharaj who was the Minister 
of Transport had to resign as a director of First Rand Banking after claims were made and 
enquiries launched about possible compensation he had received from the former African 
National Congress (ANC) fundraiser Schabir Shaik whose company had won the N3 toll road 
consortium.197  
2.10.2 Pricing is crucial 
The problems that Africa is faced with when it comes to pricing are that governments 
tend to turn to PPPs or privatisation when they cannot afford to continue providing free or 
inexpensive services.198 Private entities can indeed bring the desired efficiency, but they are not 
a magic pill. There is a need to balance the interests of the public and what is feasible for the 
government and the private entity in the provision of services. Managing the transition from 
state-subsidised services to more market-based pricing is crucial. Harris argued that in essential 
services in developing countries, governments were only recovering 60% of the costs of 
electricity in the early 1990’s. These sectors needed the greatest price adjustments with the 
incorporation of private operators becoming inevitable. Thus, the results are that the electricity 
industry has seen the most problems and has attracted the largest amount of criticism across the 
board, alongside the water industry.  
The fact that public utilities have not been pressured to collect bills for services 
delivered, has only served to further destabilise cost-recovery. An example of this is that South 
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Africa showed that by the end of July 2004, the debt owed by citizens for unpaid municipal 
services was ZAR 32 billion.199 Amongst other things, this illustrates the difficulty that poor 
people have in paying for the services. 
The pricing issue is one that plagues the whole of Africa as the regulator often has 
insufficient information on the costs of suppliers, and translating fixed costs into per unit 
charges requires complex assumptions and accounting expertise in analysis.200 Regulators will 
thus tend to permit price increases for numerous reasons such as that; they are weak or 
inadequately staffed, they are sympathetic to the state firm, or alternatively because the 
company in question has provided false or misleading information.201 In such circumstances, a 
private company may push through price increases to ensure that they maintain a comfortable 
return on their equity. South Africa’s lesson on pricing came through the Asset Procurement 
and Operating Partnership Systems (APOPS)202 prison deal, where a part of the issue was the 
high specifications which affected the cost and where the department concerned had failed to 
calculate what it was able to afford in terms of its Medium-term Budget Framework.203 
The last consideration that affects price is the high cost of doing business in Africa. The 
World Bank’s World Development Report 2005204 demonstrates that government policies and 
behaviours influence the investment climate through impacting on three things; costs, risks and 
barriers to companies that are confronted with competition.205 To improve the investment scene 
and increase the range of investment opportunities that have a chance of enjoying success, 
governments need to pay attention to the above three things as a bundle. The report points out 
that ‘the costs of contract enforcement difficulties, inadequate infrastructure, crime, corruption, 
                                                             
199 Paton C, ‘When write-offs pay’, Financial Mail, 3 September 2004. 
200 Supra note 96 at 24. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Supra note 53 at 37. 
203 Ibid. 
204 World Development Report 2005, Washington DC: World Bank. 
205 Ibid. 
 
52 
and regulation can amount to over 25% of sales — or more than three times what firms typically 
pay in taxes.’206 
2.10.3 Corruption is the bane of partnerships’ existence 
Corruption is an issue that affects Africa at large. In fact, so much that it encroaches in 
all aspect of governments including public procurement.207 The effect of corruption is felt in 
even the simplest of areas, such as tenders, where officials have found ways to direct contracts 
to their preferred bidders.208 PPPs deal with far more complex services and this in turn means 
that the choice of companies cannot be reduced to the single consideration of price. PPPs avail 
themselves to more manipulation by foreign or local firms or government officials which are 
hard for the public and anti-corruption systems to identify.209 Harris writes that “corruption 
possibilities in equipment supply and construction contracts are probably as large as those 
related to the award of concessions.”210 Other forms of corruption that have been identified in 
utility companies are job placement based on political connections or nepotism as well as 
widespread graft by public employees who exact informal payments from customers in 
exchange for reduced utility bills or shorter waits for scarce connections. Harris argues that the 
private sector has greater motivation to minimise costs and to reduce leakages from corruption 
than the public sector.211 In the same vein, Kairuki212 argues that by standardising contracting 
provisions this increases transparency and promotes trust between the public and private parties, 
which significantly reduces corruption.213 
In the advancement of the war against corruption, Transparency International (TI) has 
introduced a tool called the integrity pact which serves to enhance transparency and quality of 
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public contracting.214 The pact is an undertaking that the government department and all bidders 
for a public- sector contract will refrain from bribery during the selection process and the 
implementation of the contract stage. Bidders promise to disclose all commissions and similar 
expenses paid by them to anyone that is connected to the contract. The pact ends with sanctions 
that will apply if it is violated, which range from paying a fine or to losing the contract in its 
entirety. Peter Eigen215 advocates for the pact, saying that the pact is necessary because 
companies want to stop bribing but they do not dare to because their competitors continue to 
bribe, thus giving them an unfair competitive edge.216 By introducing this pact, all the 
companies are brought together to adopt a common standard on bribery and this reduces the 
likelihood of corruption taking root.217 Benin has incorporated this pact in their code of ethics 
and Nigeria has followed suit in some form in their projects.218 
2.10.4 Risk transfer and risk management 
The Nepad Policy paper argues that the biggest risk to both the public and private sectors 
in a PPP contract is demand risk.219 This is essentially the possibility that the consumers will 
not buy the product or service at an adequate level to render the PPP viable at the already set 
prices.220 Demand risk needs to be spread between the parties as it is not always possible to 
predict whether users will be able to or willing to shift from their current service provider or 
service option to the new one.221 This is best seen in the example of the Chapman’s Peak toll 
road in Cape Town and the Gautrain project in Gauteng.222 In the example of the Chapman’s 
Peak road, feasibility studies that were conducted showed that there was insufficient traffic but 
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that the road was an important one.223 Thus provincial government provided a subsidy upfront 
and a ‘patronage guarantee’ incase the road usage fell below a certain agreed upon amount.224 
The same happened with the Gautrain project, it was too difficult to determine at the outset 
whether road users would be willing to move away from motor vehicle usage to rail 
transportation.225 Risk mitigation stratagems are essentially financial strategies. 226 
The South African Treasury227 has three stages of approval in the PPP project set up. 
The Treasury will give its first approval if the private party has conducted a feasibility study 
which must explain the ‘strategic and operational benefits of the PPP’ as well as the ‘proposed 
allocation of financial, technical and operational risks between the institution and the private 
party.’228 Part of the feasibility study entails the drawing of a Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
model, which has to have a comparison of the cost to government for providing a particular 
service versus private provision of the service.229 The institution has to allocate costs for all the 
risks associated with doing the project, this essentially amounts to a risk-adjusted PSC model. 
The PPP Manual lists the steps for the risk-adjusted PSC model:230 
Step 1: Identify the risks.  
Step 2: Identify the impacts of each risk.  
Step 3: Estimate the likelihood of the risks occurring.  
Step 4: Estimate the cost of each risk (by multiplying the cost and the       
likelihood of it occurring).  
Step 5: Identify the strategies for risk mitigation.  
Step 6: Allocate risk (identify risks to be borne by the private party and those to 
be shared).  
Step 7: Construct a risk matrix (which consolidates all identified project risks, 
their impacts and their associated costs).  
Step 8: Construct the risk-adjusted PSC model.  
Step 9: Conduct a preliminary analysis of test affordability. Comparing the risk-
adjusted PSC model with the institution’s budget will give an indication of the 
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PPPs affordability. Various financing instruments have been developed to 
manage the risks in infrastructure projects. 
 
2.10.5 Providing a range of service options 
With governments privatising basic services, Governments in Africa have set high 
quality standards and this has meant that they needed to import engineers from developed 
countries to do the work.231 This renders the service too expensive for the poor, thus Harris has 
advised governments to assist poorer consumers by introducing alternative service options in 
water and electricity for example. Harris argues that in the electricity sector small independent 
service providers in unserved areas can enhance electricity coverage.232 An example of this is 
Cambodia where ‘around 600 entrepreneurs run small systems powered by diesel generators 
and supply 5% of national electricity consumption.233 
2.10.6 Local economic empowerment 
South Africa desires to have a more equal society and to rectify the wrongs of its 
apartheid past. One of the ways in which it attempts to do this is through Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE). It has been argued that PPPs can offer a chance for a transfer of economic 
power to the local population through increased participation in and ownership of businesses.234 
The Nepad paper sets out advantages of local empowerment through PPPs. The nature of the 
PPP contracts is such that it is long term, this nature enables growth of local equity and 
management over time. The second advantage is that risks are clearly identified, priced and 
allocated in PPPs, thus enabling the black party to know what they are committing to 
beforehand. 235Thirdly, tangible local economic development benefits can be delivered to 
targeted groups by using a combination of large, medium and small enterprises, through 
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subcontracting and procurement.236 The South African government has identified BEE as a way 
in which PPP projects can achieve ‘optimal value for money in government’s delivery of 
infrastructure and services.’237   
The disadvantages, however, to incorporating explicit empowerment principles in PPPs 
is the extra time that is required to ensure that bids comply with the regulations and that the 
extra costs involved for the government in making sure that they consider the necessary criteria 
at all the stages of the project.238 Sue Lund239 argues that initially the South African Treasury 
was confronted with the problem that there were too few black businesses in the PPP market, 
and little black capital in South Africa.240 The later years however have indicated a growth in 
black businesses and consequently black capital which has made the process easier and lowered 
the cost of BEE.241 Government is providing facilities to expand black equity, in projects where 
this equity is borrowed at commercial rates, this adds to the cost of infrastructure and service 
provision.242 Other African countries have not succeeded in creating local empowerment 
regulations to the same extent as South Africa but they have included terms in PPP contracts 
for the employment of local staff at management level.243 
 
 
 
 
2.10.7 Regulating the private sector and enforcing contracts 
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There is a need for governments to regulate and monitor PPPs to guarantee that there is 
compliance with the agreed-upon performance targets.244 Most infrastructure targets, such as 
Eskom and all the other companies that are similar to it are natural monopolies. Jerome argues 
that ‘private monopolists may seek to levy prices significantly above marginal costs or public 
monopolies may allow costs to rise above efficient levels or offer services of inferior quality.’245 
A common concern of African countries regulators is how to protect the interests of the poor 
who make up the bulk of the population.246 A conference regarding pro-poor regulations was 
conducted by the PPIAF and the Asian Development Bank.247 In this conference it was stated 
that such regulations will need to be founded on an intimate understanding of these customers, 
and specific skills are needed to gather and analyse the information acquired.248 These need to 
be accompanied by a dedication and commitment of financial and human resources.249 
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CHAPTER 3 SOUTH AFRICAN PRIVATISATION AND PPP’S 
3.1 Government contracts and classification 
In this chapter, the focus of the dissertation is turned towards the application of PPP 
agreements in South Africa. South African lawmakers and adjudicators have tended to 
stubbornly stick to the principle of a division between public and private law to justify 
subjecting the contracting state body to the same or to different treatment as private contracting 
parties. This approach has been qualified by some judges250 who argue that even though it is 
undeniable that there is often an unavoidable interplay between public and private law, 
government contracts are different, but that being said, there should be no haste to eliminate the 
bright line dividing public and private law. This rigid approach to the strict division between 
public and private law has made it difficult to consider the fact that the state is always different, 
even though the degree of difference varies depending on the circumstances of each case.251  
The strict adherence to the notion of a strict divide has hampered a creation of a robust 
and proper theory as to why the state is different and why one should treat it differently in 
certain contexts.252 The dogmatic adherence to the division has also made it difficult to develop 
substantive legal rules which would be appropriate in helping to deal with the unique context 
of government contracting.253 Administrative law focuses on the classification of the activities 
of the state as being subject to public or private law and eventually the determination of whether 
the actions of the state are subject to judicial review or not.254 Our argument going forward is 
however that the classification of the activities of the state as falling under public or private law 
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should not be a determinant of regulation, but that it should be the states distinctiveness as a 
contracting party that should determine our regulation of classification going forward.255 The 
basis of this argument derives from German and French law which both recognise the 
uniqueness of the state in the rules that are applied. This principle is found in the ratio in Logbro 
Properties256 where the rules of administrative justice framed the parties’ contractual 
relationship and governed the exercise of rights arising from the contract.  
Some scholars257 argue that this idea of ‘framing’ is crucial to facilitating an 
understanding of the relationship and expected tension between the states voluntarily assumed 
contractual responsibilities and those which are ultimately imposed by the Constitution. Once 
it is acknowledged that the state is a different kind of contracting party to ordinary contracting 
parties with special features and very specific goals, then an understanding can be developed 
of why administrative law should frame the contractual relationship and more specifically why 
contract terms may be molded and in certain cases may be expected to give way to the broader 
constitutional context.258 This does not invalidate the importance of contractual terms, and 
Justice Cameron259 affirms this significance by arguing that the contractual terms may be 
important in determining the exact ambit of the flexible duty imposed on the state to act fairly. 
The judge continued to say that with there may be times where the circumstances of the case 
necessitate an overriding of existing contractual terms by broader public duties and public 
policy considerations.260  
In summary, the argument of this chapter is that instead of looking at the classification of state 
activities as falling under public or private law and staunchly sticking to it, the focus should 
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shift towards looking at the state itself as an entity and the characteristics of it which make it a 
formidable contracting party. To contextualise this argument for this dissertation, the question 
becomes whether the actions of a state entity such as Eskom fall under public or private law? 
At this point, the Eskom characteristics should be explored. Such characteristics include the 
following: 
• Eskom has a monopoly in power supply,  
• Eskom has considerable commercial power,  
• Eskom can decide whether to negotiate contractual terms 
• Eskom performs a public function of providing electricity, in performing this 
function Eskom may at times carry out their duty using contracts, which 
ultimately fall under private law, but ultimately Eskom performs their function 
to assist the government to realise and perform its public duty of providing 
electricity to the public. 
Therefore, regardless of what Eskoms classification and its classification of activities, Eskom 
can be considered a state entity and therefore subject to administrative law. Thus, the focus now 
goes beyond an examination of the legal structure of Eskom, as well as its theoretical 
classification.  Instead, the shift can be focused on its sheer size, power and the monopoly that 
it has in the energy supply sector. In accordance with the outcome of this determination, 
regulations should be created that subject Eskom to purely public law rules and duties much 
like any other entity which resembles Eskom in size and classification as a parastatal.  
To explore this argument further, additional arguments regarding its classification will be 
examined. The general definition of government contracts was explored in some detail earlier.  
In this chapter, the exploration will go deeper, with a look at the complex definition of the term 
‘state.’261 This will be completed to illuminate the kinds of contracts regarding classification. 
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The tendency to compare the state to a normal commercial player have been most noticeable. 
This will, in turn, help inform the argument set out above against the current bias in favour of 
a strict classification of public or private law by determining the activities of the state. Next, 
explored are the unique elements that make a state unique in the contractual context.262 Such 
unique elements serve as guides for the inception of a new body of rules which will combine 
contractual and administrative elements, which will apply purely to public-private partnership 
agreements which are government contracts.263  Explored, next, are the main areas in which 
these specific rules would be desirable. Specifically, the following rules are considered 
desirable:264  
• In helping us to understand why and the extent to which a public authority’s decision 
to terminate a PPP contract should attract procedural fairness, 
• In striking a balance between government effectiveness and the public interest and  
• In recognising a claim for compensation stemming from the unlawful and sometimes 
lawful acts of the administration in certain circumstances. 
As previously discussed a government contract is a contract which has the state as one of the 
parties to the agreement and the other party is a private party. In the preceding chapters, it was 
argued that the term ‘state’ is in and of itself a very complex term.265 This complexity is further 
complicated by the new concept of procurement which allows private parties to perform public 
functions.266 The result of this mingling of the public and private sphere is that both parties may 
both end up attracting original constitutional obligations. Our key argument in this chapter is 
that when one party to the contract is clearly the state different principles must apply.267 This 
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argument is primarily applicable to government PPP contracts which Quinot268 defines as the 
state’s “commercial activities.” In the public procurement the state contracts to acquire goods 
and services from suppliers for the public good and to provide goods and services to the public 
in cases where the services are privatised and outsourced.269 This new and upcoming 
phenomenon has led to the introduction of a whole new body of law and constitutional regime 
to regulate the way in which the state exercises this power.270 The tendency to classify activities 
to determine which law to apply and the habit of equating the state to a normal commercial 
player has been most pronounced in this procurement context. 
3.2 The problem with classification 
The typical public-private dichotomy has been seen as a way to distinguish the laws that 
regulate the actions and obligations of individual rights and those which are concerned with the 
public interest.271 This widespread view of classification has allowed the shielding of the private 
contractual realm from public law interference.272 The widely accepted traditional role of public 
law is that it is aimed at controlling the government’s power through principles such as the 
separation of powers doctrine and also the relations between the state and private individuals. 
The reasoning behind an independent legal discipline stems from the belief that the state is the 
guardian of the broader public interest and is the main vessel of power.273 The exercise of this 
power must be supervised in line with the use of public funds and the way in which the powers 
and functions are exercised and performed.274 Private law on the other hand controls and 
regulates relations between individual citizens and is premised on the libertarian principles of 
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individual autonomy, self-reliance and the moral premise that promises should be honoured.275 
Legal obligations are the manifestation that comes from the free exercise of autonomous 
choices, which are bundled into the neat idea of freedom of contract and the role of the state as 
the watchman is to promote and encourage the free exercise of individual choice.276 
Public law rules can be identified by their marked nature of non-voluntary 
administrative law principles, whose justification is premised on the idea that the actions of the 
state should be scrutinised at a far higher level than the actions of its private counterparts.277 
The private parties are generally left to their own devices in regulating their affairs which are 
free from intervention that comes in the form of non-voluntary positive obligations.278 
Cockrell279 argues that the idea of supreme market relations and the high level of protection 
given to the private sphere has ushered in the “hegemony of contract law” with the 
consequences that the government's contracting activities are protected against administrative 
law intervention.280 The theory that informs this is that public bodies can also have “private 
lives” which should be governed by the ordinary rules of the market. 281  
The argument that Cachalia282 advances is that the obsession with parallel legal systems 
is not appropriate where government contracts are involved. The support for this argument can 
be found in the case KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC,283 where Froneman J in 
his separate concurring judgment argued that to the extent that the difference between public 
and private law relied on the assumptions that public law was political in nature and dealt with 
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unequal relations and private law could be said to govern the relationships between equals, one 
would require a better justification, but under the Constitution the divide between public and 
private law is irrelevant.284  
The reasons for this are that the idea of the public and private law divide is considered 
an antiquated principle premised on the even more ancient idea that the state exists exclusively 
outside of the private sphere.285 This is no longer an applicable experience as the rise and 
emergence of states as a formidable commercial actor that relies heavily on contractual means 
to advance and realise the transformative objectives of the Constitution of South Africa.286 
Therefore concepts like the ‘state’, ‘public’ and ‘private’ are no longer as static as they were in 
the past and as the traditional divide would have us believe.287 The first reason that the 
distinction between public and private law under the Constitution is diffuse is because the 
Constitution has brought a reversal in the approach to intervention in private party’s affairs and 
corporations for two reasons.288 The second reason is that many private entities have become 
big international conglomerates who have the ability to wield enormous power.289  
As stated earlier in the dissertation, Hoexter argued that society has and is producing 
“giant commercial and social entities that not only rival the state's authority in certain fields but 
which act increasingly like state institutions – as 'private governments'.”290 Because of this there 
are reasonable and indeed appropriate reasons for intervention even in cases where there are 
prima facie private interests at war.  Intervention is that there has been an increase in private 
parties performing public functions which puts to question why there is a continued staunch 
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protection of private contractual relations.291 This leads Cachalia to conclude that the regulation 
of government contracts within the framework of the public-private law dichotomy is not only 
unhelpful but it is impractical and untenable in the current constitutional context of South 
Africa.292  
If one considers foreign jurisdictions such as Germany and France, these countries have 
independent systems of administrative courts which exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a 
special category of administrative contracts.293 Classification has played an important role in 
the laws of foreign jurisdictions but it has not taken place along the lines of the traditional 
public-private law divide.294 If one considers France for example, they follow a system of 
separate administrative and civil courts. It is the presence of the term service public, which 
denotes a public authority’s activities engaged in in the pursuit of meeting a public need.295 
Another term that sets apart administrative contracts from civil contracts is the clauses 
exorbitantes, which means superior powers have been conferred on the state, such as the ability 
to unilaterally vary or terminate a contract.296  
The presence of these terms in contracts in France is the deciding factor in classifying 
the contract as an administrative contract or as a civil contract.297 For instance, contracts that 
are entered into for the provision of goods and services to the public fall under the jurisdiction 
of administrative courts as they are always aimed at satisfying a public need.298 Whereas 
contracts for the acquisition of goods and services will only fall into the administrative court’s 
jurisdiction if in addition to providing a service to the public, the clauses exorbitantes is also 
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present.299 This indicates that as opposed to applying the traditional classification of laws, there 
is recognition in the criteria that special reasons exist for treating government contracts 
differently.300  
A typical example of classification in South Africa is when there is an attempt to differentiate 
between government contracts that are commercial in nature, which would mean they fall under 
private law as they are regulated by a contract, and those which are non-commercial and would 
be regulated by administrative law.301  
Under this approach, there are three factors that are used to justify equating the state to an 
ordinary commercial actor. The factors are that; there must be an equality in bargaining power 
between the state and the private party, the state must be found to have exercised purely 
contractual rights as opposed to statutory rights and lastly the contract should not be aimed at 
realising a public purpose or promoting a public interest.302 If for argument sake it was 
acknowledged that it is possible to have such a clear distinction, Cachalia argues that a more 
useful approach than classification would be to use these three factors to determine the extent 
to which the state is different from the ordinary commercial party to justify how and the extent 
to which different treatment is justifiable in each case.303  
3.3 Distinguishing factors of the State as a contracting party 
It is unarguable that government contracts are entered into for a specific purpose; they 
are limited by their empowering statutes which gives them validity and they are uniquely 
affected by public policy considerations. This argument is the nub of Baxter’s observation that 
the liberal ideology of constitutionalism does not treat public authorities with the same 
generosity as private persons and they do not enjoy the same liberties as their private 
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counterparts. It is necessary to qualify the statement that the state does not enjoy the same 
‘liberty’ as the private party.  
3.4 The State must act lawfully 
The reasons that the state is constrained in its liberty in contract are because the state is 
compelled to act lawfully.304 This means that the state cannot act without an empowering 
provision, the state may not act outside of the ambit of its empowering provision and the state 
must act for the public interest. When the state exercises its freedom to contract, it is held to a 
higher overarching constitutional standard of legality.305 In Greys Marine306 the Supreme Court 
held that: "The Constitution is the repository of all state power. That power is distributed 
by the Constitution – directly and indirectly – amongst the various institutions of state and other 
public bodies and functionaries and its exercise is subject to inherent constitutional constraint 
– if only for legality". There is, however, a difference between the states capacity to enter into 
a valid contract and the way in which the state exercises its existing contracting power.307  
3.4.1 The State has limited capacity to contract 
The capacity of private entities to enter into contracts is relatively unlimited, but the 
state's commercial capacity must be exercised within the confines of its constitutional and 
statutory empowering provisions. The determination of capacity for a party entering into a 
contract is not a very strict one.308 One only needs to show that they have the capacity to enter 
into the contract by virtue of being a major and that they have the requisite mental capacity to 
appreciate the terms and consequences of entering into a contract and that the contract that they 
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are entering into is not contrary to public policy.309 Therefore the presumption is that a private 
party has the capacity to contract unless otherwise proven.310  
When it comes to the state's capacity to contract, however, the state is considerably 
limited. Since all the states power now has to be viewed within the parameters of the 
Constitution.311 over and above the constitutional provisions, s 1 of the State Liability Act 20 
0f 1957312 provides that, "Any claim against the State which would, if that claim had arisen 
against a person … shall be cognizable by [a] court, [provided] the claim arises out of any 
contract lawfully entered into on behalf of the State". This means that if a person has entered 
into a contract with the state that person may enforce the contract if the public authority acted 
with the necessary capacity, failure to act with the requisite capacity renders the action of the 
authority as ultra vires and the contract is therefore not valid and liable to be set aside.313 
The two key restrictions on the state's capacity to act are that it must be empowered to act and 
it must act within those empowering provisions. These restrictions on the state's capacity to 
contract indicate that the state is indeed different to the private contractor. 314 Cachalia argues 
that it has been pointed out that a further constraint to the states capacity to contract should be 
parliamentary approbation, which is the provision of money by Parliament as a prerequisite to 
validity.315  
Many in South Africa have, however, argued that the absence of parliamentary 
approbation and lack of funds should not affect the validity of the contract. In MEC: 
Department of Police, Roads and Transport, Free State Provincial Government v Terra 
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Graphics (Pty) Ltd316 ("Terra Graphics") the provincial government of the Free State refused 
to pay a contractor who had undertaken work to rehabilitate the roads in the Free State, on the 
grounds that they had not budgeted for the work and therefore had no funds with which to pay 
him.317 The court found that the work had been budgeted for but it held in obiter that if there 
was a lack of funds to meet the state's contractual obligations, the state could not avoid its 
contractual obligation, thus the contract would remain binding on the state.318 
3.4.2 The Manner in which the State exercises its contracting powers must be lawful 
In situations where the government is deemed to have satisfied the capacity element, it 
is still required to observe the constitutional and statutory constraints on the lawful exercise of 
its contracting powers.319 An example of this is s 195(1) of the Constitution that public 
administration is accountable and it should foster transparency by giving timeouts, accessible 
and accurate information to the public.320 The section also sets out that the state must promote 
efficient, economic and effective use of resources, maintain a high standard of professional 
ethics, be development orientated, give an impartial, fair and equitable bias free service as well 
as respond to the needs of South Africans.321  
There is a further burden on the government to "respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights" in all circumstances.322 This applies to all the activities 
that the state engages in even in outwardly private commercial contracts.323 In the procurement 
context there is a range of statutory and constitutional restraints on the states contractual 
freedom. Addressed has been s 217(1) of the Constitution which calls for fair, equitable, 
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transparent, competitive and cost efficiency when the government's contracts for goods or 
services.324 Additionally, the founding values of our democracy are accountability, 
transparency, and openness.325 The fundamental notion being that the state is expected to justify 
its decisions to the broader South African community.326 This is particularly important in the 
procurement setting where the expenditure of large amounts of money is commonplace and 
may be the site where essential government policies which may have far-reaching impacts on 
the broader public community.327  
The key argument here is that public bodies are different to ordinary contracting parties 
even if they purport to act as commercial players, the reason for this is owed to the fact that the 
state is accountable to the broader public South African community.328 An appropriate depiction 
of this principle is AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer 
of the South African Social Security Agency329 (No 2) (AllPay 2) which involved the awarding 
of a tender for the payment of social grants by the Social Security Agency of South Africa, 
henceforth SASSA, to Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) which was subsequently found to be 
unlawful.330 In the determination of the appropriate relief, SASSA was required to re-run the 
tendering process, with the possibility that a new provider would be appointed. The court found 
that SASSA which is a statutory public creature and CPS which is a private entity were organs 
of state for the purposes of the contract and that because of their public nature they had 
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obligations that extended beyond mere contractual terms.331 Thus the contract itself attracted 
and imposed constitutional obligations. The court further found that with respect to SASSA, by 
concluding the contract SASSA could not rid itself of its constitutional duty and public 
accountability for rendering the public services. SASSA remained accountable to the South 
African community for the performance of CPS’s functions.332 
The court went on to reason that by virtue of CPS concluding the contract for the 
rendering of public services, it also because accountable to the broader public in relation to the 
public power that it had acquired and the public function that it had to perform.333 Two 
consequences arose from this finding. The first is that even after the termination of the 
agreement due to invalidity, but before a new contractor is selected, CPS could not walk away 
from its duties as it had a constitutional obligation to ensure that a workable system was put in 
place until such time that a new system was implemented and operational.334 The second 
consequence related CPS’s accounting responsibilities, in the event that CPS saw the contract 
to its five-year conclusion, any benefit that CPS got would not be beyond public scrutiny as its 
assumption of public power and functions in the execution of the contract meant that with 
regard to its gains and losses under the contract, CPS ought to be publically accountable.335 
Thus CPS had to submit audited statements of the account after it completed the five year period 
of the expenses they incurred, the income they received and the net profit that they earned under 
the completed contract.336  
3.5 The State must act in the public interest 
In order to circumvent the application of administrative principles, there is a suggestion 
that a distinction should be drawn between contracts which are meant to serve a “public 
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purpose” or advance the “public interest” and those which do not.337 Quinot argues that in his 
opinion state actions are taken in the public interest regardless of how general that interest may 
be.338  This dissertation agrees with this argument, with the further addition that the element of 
public interest is an ever-present feature in everything that the state does as a contracting party, 
as this sets it apart from other contracting parties. This element of public interest is also the best 
rationalisation for subjecting the state to a higher standard of accountability in a contractual 
setting.339   
The fact that the state utilises public funds and is the guardian of public resources 
justifies why the public has an interest in government contracts.340 Furthermore Cachalia argues 
that the core purpose of the state contractor entering into a contract is different to its private 
counterpart as the state contracts to further the public interest, whereas the private a party 
contracts to further their individual interests.341 The states contractual relationships do not serve 
a purpose in and of themselves, they are entered into to assist the state in realising and fulfilling 
its responsibilities to the public for the public’s interest.342  This difference gives government 
contracts a public character despite the fact that it uses private law modes of concluding 
business.343  
In foreign jurisdictions this element of the state entering into a contract to fulfil its duties 
of providing services to the public is an important reason to trigger administrative regulation.344 
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Germany has gone as far as appointing an official who represents the interest of the public in 
litigation.345 English law states that public authorities are obliged to take into account the wider 
community interests and it is thus acceptable in certain circumstances to breach a contract 
grounds of public interest by inserting a “break clause.”346 Effectually the rights of the private 
contracting party are subordinate to the demands of the public’s interest and public policy by 
conferring on the state an immunity against the ordinary consequences of breaching a 
contract.347  
A South African principle that is similar to the English break clause is the principle of 
‘subsequent fettering.’348 It is worth noting that there is a difference between fettering at the 
time that the contract is entered into and where unforeseen events transpire which would amount 
to a “subsequent fetter” on the states powers.349 It is therefore not the state’s capacity to enter 
into the contract that is disputed but rather the lawfulness of a decision to enforce a validly 
concluded contract.350 To avoid committing an unlawful act the state would thus be warranted 
in refusing to perform on the grounds that it would not be in the public’s interest to so proceed 
unlawfully.351 If this is deemed to be the case then it will be an important privilege that is 
afforded to the state.  
To summarise the general consensus amongst the jurisdictions that have been discussed 
thus far are that the public interest consideration may at times necessitate that public bodies be 
given special rights, despite the express contractual terms, in order to ensure the welfare of the 
broader community.352 Turpin argues that the prevalence of the public interest factor in 
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government contracts serves to limit the ‘consensual character of the contract’ by assigning 
these powers to the public authority “whose true basis is public policy rather than the agreement 
between the parties.” 353  
3.6 The State has superior bargaining power 
In considering the mere size, influence and economic prowess of the state, one is forced 
to question how it could ever be equated to an ordinary market player. More particularly when 
one considers the proverbial deep pockets, the state is typically immune to the risks of financial 
ruin that private players have to contend with.354 An illustration of this is the availability of 
government guarantees and loans which keep public bodies afloat in times of financial struggle, 
not to mention that the state has the backing of the national focus which allows the state to more 
eagerly assume the risks of litigation.355 Furthermore, it is not uncommon for a public body to 
find itself in a monopolistic position with the added benefit of bargaining power. Added to this 
argument is the fact that the state is not the typical market player that is profit motivated and 
participate in the market the way that private actors do.356  
The state is impervious to pressures that private players have to contend with such as 
market competition, in fact, the market pressures do not affect the state negatively as they often 
work in the state's favour.357 This is because the more competition there is in the market, the 
better the price and quality guarantee becomes.358  Government contracts such as PPP 
agreements are often lucrative and long lasting which allows the state to garner the best possible 
bargain for itself.359 The argument being made that the states sheer size is reason enough to 
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treat it differently when it contracts does not mean that the state will never meet its equal in 
power and financial positioning.360 In fact, there are conglomerates and organisations whose 
financial position and power far outweighs that of a state, but in such situations, government 
contracts are often unilaterally imposed in the sense that you accept or decline the terms.361 In 
the procurement context, the scope to negotiate or vary contractual terms after the tender has 
been awarded is severely limited.362 Granted that there may be situations where the balance of 
power is not in favour of the government, particularly where it is confronted with a substantial 
undertaking or has no choice as to the contractor, one cannot deny the intimidating economic 
power of the state as a defining feature of its contractual uniqueness.363 
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CHAPTER 4 APPLYING GERMAN PPP CASE STUDY TO ESKOM 
Thus far in the dissertation, the focus has been on general application of PPP and 
administrative law concerning the distinction between private and public law. However, now 
the focus will shift towards a specific application, which will serve as a means to better 
understanding how PPP may be implemented in certain contexts in South Africa. This 
application is that of the German PPP governing electricity in South Africa. In other words, the 
current PPP application in the German electricity industry will be assessed and then applied to 
the current situation in South Africa. For the formation of such an application, one particular 
body of rules need to be assessed, as such rules are crucial for understanding how one PPP 
application can be hypothetically implemented in another state. Specifically, Logbros, the 
principle of “framing,” and its recognition that administrative law provides the overarching 
framework within which contractual undertakings operate. To ensure that administrative law 
terms are applied in contexts where they are relevant, and to ensure the continued application 
of contractual terms, one has to address the following questions: how is the state different from 
the ordinary contracting party? To what extent does that contracting party require 
protection?364 These questions are asked to determine what the relevant rules are and the scope 
of their application in a particular case.365  
4.1 Unequal bargaining power and termination of a contract 
The idea of unequal bargaining powers has been influential in the French system where 
one of the reasons for subjecting the state to the administrative law is the presence of the “clause 
exorbitantes.”366 South Africa treats this criterion as a way in which to classify the states 
conduct as being subject to the public or private law as opposed to as a foundation for the 
introduction of substantive rules for when the state is superior, why its presence or absence 
matters and how this should inform our regulatory approach.  
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An illustration of this is Mustapha v Receiver of Revenue, Lichtenberg, a pre-1994 case which 
pertained to the granting and then termination of a land occupation permit to Indian people in 
terms of the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. The judge there found that Mustapha had 
agreed that his permit would be terminable on notice. The notice liability arose from his 
voluntary consent, not arbitrary statutory provisions that were imposed on him. In Schreiner 
JA’s dissenting judgment, he held that given that the negotiating power of Mustapha was clearly 
limited by statutory provisions, the idea that any negotiation could have taken place was highly 
unlikely. This was a typical case where the state was exercising its superior authority and this 
should have been a basis upon which to subject the state to a higher standard of fairness than 
would otherwise have been necessary had contractual negotiation been possible.  
A more recent case is Cape Metropolitan v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) 
CC ("Cape Metropolitan"), which involved an agreement with a private entity to outsource a 
statutory duty to collect levies. The public body exercised its right to cancel the contract on the 
grounds of fraud and one of the main reasons for the court subjecting the dispute to contractual 
regulation was because in the court's opinion this was the apparent equality of negotiating 
power. The SCA found that: 
[The terms] could not be dictated ... by virtue of [the state's] position as a public 
authority. They were agreed to by [the private entity] a very substantial commercial 
undertaking. The [state], when it concluded the contract, was therefore not acting from 
a position of superiority or authority by virtue of its being a public authority and, in 
respect of the cancellation, did not, by virtue of its being a public authority, find itself 
in a stronger position than the position it would have been in had it been a private 
institution.367  
 
The dominant idea here is “dictated” rather than negotiated terms. The justification that the 
court gave for this was scant as it held that when a state deals with an equally powerful 
commercial entity, the terms could be assumed to have been agreed to. Cameron then interprets 
this statement later on in the Logbro case but goes on to add that in addition to the “element of 
                                                             
367 Ibid. 
78 
superiority” it would also be necessary to state that the contract was entered into with a 
“substantial” commercial entity: “[T]he case establishes the proposition that a public authority's 
invocation of a power of cancellation in a contract concluded on equal terms with a major 
commercial undertaking, without any element of superiority or authority deriving from its 
public position, does not amount to an exercise of public power".368 A further issue with the 
approach of classification is that it assumes that private law dictates relations between persons 
of equal powers.369 This is however not realistic nor true in keeping with the modern experience 
where large corporations wield colossal levels of power over individuals.370  
For the sake of argument, if one were to accept that equality in bargaining power is 
possible, and that the state does not dictate the terms, it is still not valid to say that the contract 
is entirely commercial and therefore immune from administrative law intervention as the 
constitutional and statutory constraints on the states contractual capacity persists in the way that 
the state exercises its powers.371 Thus for the purposes of classification, the factor of superiority 
should not be invoked exclusively. Rather the value of the superiority element should provide 
us with a justification for treating the state differently in situations where it has superior 
power.372  
4.2 Procedural fairness 
One of the key issues that arise from case law is whether the exercising of the right to 
cancel by the public body attracts procedural fairness.373 The approach to this has been 
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inconsistent and much of the reasoning has emphasised the source of the power rather than the 
degree to which the state is different or the reasons why the other party needs protection. 374 
If one looks at the Cape Metropolitan, case even though the council’s power to enter into the 
contract derived from the regulations, the SCA held that the power to cancel on the grounds of 
fraud stemmed from contract and common law.375 Thus the court concluded that the council 
had not been performing a public duty or implementing legislation but rather that it was 
exercising contractual right premised on the mutual consent of the parties in respect of a 
commercial contract. The court did not deem the fact relevant that both the contract and 
regulations recognised the right of the council to terminate the contract on the grounds of fraud, 
even more strange was that the court suggested that had the council relied on the regulation as 
opposed to the contract then it would have been deemed to have exercised a public power.376  
Similarly, in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Thabiso Chemicals (Pty) 
Ltd377 a cleaning materials tender was expressly given, subject to certain regulations and 
specific conditions. When the contract that had come about as a result of the tender was 
terminated the judge refused to recognise a role for administrative law. He held that the 
regulations and other conditions of the tender had been integrated into the contract by reference 
and that any rights that were exercised derived from that contract.378 As a result in 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service (SARS) v Trend Finance (Pty) Ltd,379 SARS was 
given the power by the Customs and Excise to enforce conditions on the release of a shipment 
of shoes. The court relied on the source of the power and in accordance with that the court held 
that since the power to subject the release of the shoes was a statutory power, notwithstanding 
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its contractual element, SARS had acted from a position of authority and had therefore acted 
from a position of authority and accordingly had performed an administrative act.380  
The key point to note from all the cases discussed thus far is that room for negotiating 
was substantially limited if it was at all present, and for that reason the state should have been 
compelled to act fairly in line with its public duty.381 Most of the cases discussed thus far 
involved procurement which involves large amounts of public money and the provision of 
important services. This is clearly shown in cases like KC Productions382 where the department 
had gone through the necessary tender process, concluded a contract, delayed implementation 
and then summarily terminated the contract, alleging that the process had been a waste. This 
case necessitated that the state be subjected to a more stringent standard to encourage the state 
to justify its reasons for terminating the agreement.383  
When it is so determined that a duty to act in a fair manner does exist due to the 
inequalities in bargaining power and an element of a public interest, the difficulty is determining 
the latitude of this duty and whether the failure to conform will attract a judicial review enquiry 
into the states actions as the dominant mode of control of public power.384 Considerations of 
resources and efficiency implications of an overly invasive judicial review are important thus 
they should affect the content of public duties as opposed to determining applicability.385 The 
court explained this in Joseph386: 
"Administrative efficiency is an important goal in a democracy, and 
courts must remain vigilant not to impose unduly onerous administrative 
burdens on the state bureaucracy … however, [this issue] primarily 
informs the content of the duties imposed under administrative law 
rather than the scope of the application of administrative law … [t]he 
practical concerns … should not be decisive in determining the scope of 
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administrative action, but must inform the content of procedural 
fairness."387 
 
To sum up the considerations of the proposed enquiry, it is the scope of protection that 
is required in respect to a particular party and more generally the public interest element coupled 
with factors such as government effectiveness and efficiency that should indicate the kind of 
administrative justice that is necessary.388 The current focus is now turned towards 
compensation arising from the unlawful and in some cases lawful actions of the state. 
4.3 Compensation 
If a contractor suffers an unforeseeable loss deriving from the unlawful and where 
relevant, the lawful actions of the state, the recognition of a right to be compensated is crucial 
in developing specific principles applicable to government contracts.389 One of the things that 
make the French system strong is that it follows a broad conception of “public body liability” 
which Mitchell argues has allowed for a greater willingness to recognise the possibility of 
compensation for unforeseen financial loss.390 
Cachalia proposes two instances in which South African law can make allowance for a 
claim for compensation.391 She distinguishes between claims for out of pocket expenses and 
claims for loss of profit where the importance of this is less. Cachalia argues that the 
justifications for this argument derive from the French principle fait du prince392 which calls 
for a balancing act between the individuals’ rights on the one hand and the broader public 
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interest concerns on the other.393 Cachalia394 advances the argument that factors that can be 
taken into account in order to recognise a rights to compensation in South African law include:  
(i)   section 8(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act which allows a court to 
make an order that is "just and equitable", where the act constitutes administrative 
action; 
(ii)   if the act does not constitute administrative action, but there is a breach of the 
principle of legality, then arguably section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution permits a court 
to make "any order that is just and equitable"; or 
(iii)   by developing the wrongfulness criterion in the law of delict to recognise a claim 
for damages for out-of-pocket expenses. 
 
4.3.1 Lawful acts of government 
A situation that involves the conclusion of a valid contract in which an unforeseen event 
happens that necessitates the termination or modification of the contract is something that 
academics struggle with.395 South African law does not deal with this directly. However, in 
cases where legislation is enacted and amounts to unlawful fetter on the exercise of government 
discretion, thus requiring cancellation of the contract on the grounds of public interest. Baxter396 
argues that a distinction should be made between “initial invalidity” and “subsequent 
invalidity.” This is done in order to determine whether compensation should be paid or not. In 
the case of initial invalidity, the contract is invalid ab nitio whereas in the latter case the contract 
is deemed to have been validly concluded but subsequent events made performance unlawful 
on the grounds of fettering. An illustration of this was in KZN Joint Liaison Committee397 where 
the judge argued that if the contract for the payment of subsidies to the independent schools had 
been entered into by the department of education and the independent schools, then the state 
may have been able to rely on budgetary constraints as a ground for refusing to perform on the 
agreement.398 The judge argued that even if the formation of the contract was not contested, its 
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content would nonetheless still have been contrary to public policy as it fettered the discretion 
of the state to expand public money in the public interest.399 
Most academics are of the opinion that allowing a public body to avoid performance of its 
contractual duties should attract the payment of compensation for losses that arise as a result.400 
This situation is a typical example of the features of the state that make it unfair for the state to 
be treated as an ordinary contracting party.  
4.3.2 Unlawful acts of government 
Unlawful behaviour on the part of the state often infects the tender process and often 
results in financial harm to private contractors. In Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape401 a tender for the supply of equipment and services for fingerprints and photos 
for the enrolment of social welfare beneficiaries was awarded to Balraz.402 Balraz’s award of 
tender was subsequently set aside and a new tender process was initiated and issued. As Balraz 
was financially distressed he could not afford to bid a second time. Balraz then sued for out of 
pocket expenses arguing that the loss it suffered was caused by its reliance on the initial award 
of the tender in its favour.  The court was unwilling to recognise the claim and held that the 
contractor should have taken steps to protect itself by negotiating a right to restitution in the 
contract and that public interest considerations required that public bodies be immune to 
damages claims.403 Cachalia argues that this decision was restrictive and that the minority 
judgments approach was better, in that the court should have allowed for out of pocket expenses 
but not for the loss of profits.404 The minority decision acknowledged that Balraz should have 
been reimbursed for out of pocket expenses incurred in good faith but not for the loss of profits. 
Authority for this argument is found in AllPay2 where the court held that while "[i]t s true that 
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any invalidation of the existing contract as a result of the invalid tender should not result in any 
loss to [CPS]. The converse, however, is also true. It has no right to benefit from an unlawful 
contract." 405 Recognition that contracting parties should not be worse off as a result 
of the unlawful acts of the state is an important justification for allowing compensation in these 
circumstances.406 
4.4 German-South African PPP comparison 
What makes the application of administrative law regarding PPPs in Germany so 
complicated is the fact that there is no one body of law that explicitly governs PPPs.407 Rather, 
there is an abundant diversity of rules, regulations, laws, and recommendations regarding the 
proper formation and functioning of PPPs in Germany.408 Moreover, convoluting the matter, is 
the emergence of laws that conflicts with or are uncomplimentary to existing law at various 
levels. For example, there is a divulgence of legislation at the levels of the federal and state 
levels.409 Development of state law concerning PPPs should be much more attuned and 
complementary to federal law concerning PPPs. Otherwise, development in the public sector 
may become much more difficult to understand, in legal terms, when administrative law 
regarding PPPs are involved.  
One of the most important legal acts to emerge in Germany regarding PPPs is the PPP 
Acceleration Act of 2005.410 The primary purpose behind this act was the removal of barriers 
to PPP development in Germany. This purpose was carried out through the amendment of 
several laws that had previously been restrictive of PPP development, intentionally or 
otherwise. A very significant effect of the PPP Acceleration Act was the redefining of the term 
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public contracts. In particular, the definition of public contracts was clarified, in such a way 
that organizations and governments could more easily identify public contracts and distinguish 
them from strictly private contracts. The previously murky definition of public contracts 
effectively served as a barrier for making decisions regarding PPPs. The simple act of 
clarification seemed to help solidify the application of PPP law, given that organizations could 
more easily identify and distinguish public contracts from others. 
The PPP Acceleration Act also established a new means of public procurement.411 This 
new means is referred to as competitive dialogue and is intended to allow for contracts to be 
granted to public contractors much more easily. Previously, the process for public contracting 
included various steps that would often serve as deterrents for granting such contracts. Thus, 
through the establishment of specific means by which public contracts could be granted in a 
simpler manner under certain conditions, PPPs were opened up substantially, meaning that their 
existence was much more easily achieved and sustained. Likewise the actual invitation for 
public contracts was amended procedurally, to be more attainable. However the changes made 
under the PPP Acceleration Act increased the accessibility of public contractors to contracts, 
thus increasing the likelihood of public contracts being awarded across many German 
industries.  
One of the major changes made under the PPP Acceleration Act was the amendment of 
Germany’s Federal Budget Law. Specifically, Section Seven of the law was modified through 
the PPP Acceleration Act to allow private and public entities to account for potential risk during 
any economic assessment for compliance with the requirements under the section. What this 
accomplished, particularly, was that risk  became a significant factor in economic assessments 
concerning both private and public contracting deals. In itself, this may not have had a huge 
influence on PPPs in Germany, but there was another set of changes to Germany’s Federal 
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Budget Law that had a strong effect on PPPs in Germany. The Federal Budget Law was 
amended to allow the federal government to sell public property to private parties, despite there 
being substantial public demand for the use of such property. This opened up contracts for 
federal land to be sold through lease provision programs, meaning that the private buyers were 
required to lease the land for public use for a number of years after the sale. This helped to 
bolster a German market in which private property could be sold for public purposes, leaving 
such property under the PPP umbrella. 
The PPP Acceleration Act was just one of many legislative changes that affected 
German PPPs.412With the PPP acceleration and markets opening up in Germany for PPPs, 
substantial planning has been required for PPPs in Germany, more especially because many of 
the German PPP projects are large in nature. For example, many German PPPs are 
infrastructural projects, with a combination of private and public owners, operators, and 
administrators. The facilitation of such projects has led to many structural and legal changes in 
Germany, at both the federal and state level. In particular, rules have been established in 
Germany for the operation of PPPs in certain industries and for particular purposes. While in 
some cases public law applies and in others private law applies, the creation of PPP-specific 
law in Germany has allowed for greater flexibility to be introduced into such projects, for both 
classification and practical purposes. 
An interesting characteristic of the recent proliferation of German PPPs, facilitated by 
legal changes such as those under the PPP Acceleration Act, is that PPPs continue to grow in 
number and impact, despite global, regional and national economic conditions.413 In many cases 
and for many countries, public spending can increase year-on-year during times of economic 
slowdown or decline. After all, governments may increase their lending to keep companies 
afloat and often try to stimulate the economy through increased public purchases. The legal 
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framework for PPPs creates such an avenue for public spending. German state and federal 
governments can stimulate the economy and establish the infrastructure required for future 
economic growth during times of economic recession or slowdown through PPPs. Even when 
private businesses are struggling, public funding behind PPP projects can spur economic growth 
and thus, minimise the effects of a recession. Meanwhile, public contracts are, in many ways, 
more guaranteed than private contractors. The likelihood of the German state collapsing, for 
example, is lower than the likelihood of a private German company failing during a recession. 
Thus, there are justifiable reasons for governments investing in PPP projects even during 
recessions, global, regional, or national. 
4.4.1 The nature of German PPPs 
German PPPs are the result of agreements between public and private partners.414 Such 
agreements primarily governed by private law, but there are exceptions where public law may 
apply and further exceptions in which PPP-specific laws apply. Concerning the application of 
PPP-specific laws, these are regulatory in nature, rather than simply blended private and public 
law principles. The public side of the agreement can range from the German state as an entity 
to individual government bodies, and even local governments. On the private side, a single 
company may serve as the sole partner working with a public partner or a consortium of 
businesses can serve as the private stakeholders for the agreement.  
As mentioned earlier, there is no clear legal framework in Germany for PPPs, but simply 
two separate bodies of public and private laws and, then, just a few separate provisions for PPPs 
in federal and state laws. Such provisions rely heavily on existing law concerning both public 
and private ventures. In some cases, federal laws provides a general structure for PPPs and state 
and local laws fill in the legislative gaps. The laws governing PPPs in federal and state law 
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includes administrative law, constitutional law, public procurement law, public subsidies law, 
corporate law, contract law, and tax law. 
Increasing competition has been an important goal in Germany.415 On one hand, there is a well-
defined need to establish order through regulations in which, the public and private distinction 
of which is extremely important. On the other hand, many German leaders have embraced 
capitalist models, such that deregulation is the key for the promotion of the state’s economy. 
From one perspective, the proliferation of PPPs marks greater public control over private 
markets. But from another, the willingness of governments to allow private control in otherwise 
public endeavours marks a shift towards more free markets and fewer regulations. Thus, the 
proliferation of PPPs has been Germany’s aspiration since 2005. 
The first step in establishing a PPP is the identification of possible projects, generally 
with public purposes, by public entities.416 It is possible, of course, for private entities to propose 
PPP projects and goals, but it is more common for public entities to start the process. In some 
cases, law may dictate how such projects are initiated. In some cases, the law requires that 
certain public servants or administrators begin the process of securing funding for projects that 
fall under certain categories. Thus, under German law relating to PPPs, public officials are 
responsible for initiating these projects. Of course, this does not mean that private organizations 
or individuals cannot informally propose such projects, only that such projects require formal 
initiation by certain public officials. Similarly, in most cases of PPP projects, there is some 
requirement for the projects to be initiated by public officials. 
Once a basis for the project has been established, the financing for the project must be 
proposed and approved, based on the administrative budgets of each government. The financing 
for such projects is heavily dependent on various laws, including administrative, tax, and 
constitutional laws. At this point, the public purpose of the PPP must be clear and fall under the 
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appropriate purposes for financing. In some cases, approval from certain boards is required. It 
should also be noted that there are certain limits placed on the sale of public property, which 
can make it difficult for public officials to get approval for such projects. This is why the 
allowance of considering risk under the PPP Acceleration Act is so important. After all, many 
public officials rely on the risks of property devaluation, for example, to justify the sale of 
public property in a PPP deal.  
All German PPP arrangements include performance expectations.417 That is, the partners 
in the PPP contract must not only show the public purpose of the use of the property, but must 
have measures for the success of such use. Improper management of the property, for example, 
could lead to the contract being unfulfilled and thus the PPP terminated in favor of the public 
retaining the property. In most cases, the terms are modest, allowing private parties sufficient 
time and resources for the successful completion of the goals of the PPP contract. It should be 
noted, here, that there are often multiple private parties bidding on the contract. Thus, the 
negotiation of the terms of the contract are effectively private parties informing the public 
partners of their capabilities and expectations. Governed by German law, private parties have 
to have a fair chance of obtaining a PPP contract. In other words, governments cannot favour 
certain private organizations, but must award contracts based on bids and likelihood of success. 
A recent PPP in Germany involved the extension of many of the major roads in Germany. As 
Schaefer and Voland state:  
Some of the most important PPP projects in Germany concern the extension of 
parts of German motorways (Autobahnen). In these so called A-models ('A' as 
an abbreviation for Autobahnausbau; motorway extension), the private partner 
takes over responsibility for extending the number of lanes as well as for paying 
the costs of maintenance and operation of both the existing and new lanes in 
certain parts of existing motorways. In return, the private partner gets the 
revenues from the heavy goods vehicle (HGV) tolls (tolls paid for the use of the 
motorways by HGVs). Additionally, the federal government may pay an initial 
subsidy to get the project started. The details of these A-models are governed by 
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a concession contract. Currently, the following A-models are in the process of 
being executed.418 
 
This particular PPP involved a private company effectively owning this public property in order 
to advance the road extension and redevelopment project. But most PPPs in Germany are the 
extension, repurposing, or administration of public buildings or public functions. For example, 
hospitals, prisons, and schools are common types of property under PPP projects. In some cases, 
private organizations are responsible for expanding a school and operating the school during 
the expansion.  
In other cases, prisons have been sold to private parties so that such parties can operate 
the prisons indefinitely. As long as the prison operators and administrators follow the public 
law concerning the required operations of prisons, then the contract remains active. Poor 
performance or being unable to meet the essential requirements of operations under public law 
could mean the state resumes control over the prison or a different private party is granted the 
contract on the same or similar terms. Returning to the case of the road extension project in 
Germany, the requirements for the PPP were stated at the outset in the terms of the contract. As 
mentioned earlier, these requirements tend to be long-term and have some flexibility. Below 
are the specific requirements under the original contract for the PPP: 
• A1 between Bremen and Buchholz in Lower Saxony: extension from two to three lanes 
in each direction (72.5km long); contract period for maintenance and operation: 30 
years; 
• A4 in Thuringia: construction of a 22.5km-long section of the motorway as well as 
extension of existing sections; contract period for maintenance and operation: 30 years; 
• A5 between Malsch and Offenburg in Baden-Württemberg: extension from two to three 
lanes in each direction for a 41.5kmlong section of the motorway as well as maintenance 
and operation of a 59.7km-long section of the motorway for 30 years; the contract 
volume amounts to approximately €600m; and 
• A8 between Munich and Augsburg in Bavaria: extension from two to three lanes in each 
direction for a 37km-long section of the motorway as well as maintenance and operation 
of a 52km-long section of the motorway for 30 years.419 
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As is shown above, these requirements are very specific, which is one of the requirements for 
PPP approval in Germany. After all, there must be demonstrable public purposes for the projects 
to be approved.  
4.4.2 The purpose of comparing German and South African PPP law 
It is the purpose of this dissertation to identify and, preliminarily, address issues 
involving all aspects of administrative law PPPs. As such it is important for current PPP systems 
to be compared to potential and current PPP systems in South Africa. Through this purpose, 
increased accountability for South African PPP legal frameworks can be achieved. One of the 
more specific objectives of the current discussion is the determination of whether South Africa 
should have complete privatisation of electricity provided through Eskom. One of the main 
concerns is whether such privatisation would lead to a denial of access to electricity to the poor 
in South Africa. Another concern, is whether there is a lack of financial strength to pay for the 
continued use of electricity, given the high rates and resulting inability of citizens to pay for 
electricity.  The comparison of South African and German administrative law will establish the 
appropriateness of such a PPP project in South Africa. Thus, examined here is whether or not 
privatisation through PPP agreements can result in improved delivery of electricity to the poor 
in South Africa. On the basis of this evaluation, recommendations are made for the development 
of South African administrative law based on existing conditions in South Africa and German 
PPP implementation, especially concerning electricity.  
4.4.3 Context for South African PPP implementation 
In this section, a context for the possible implementation of PPP projects, especially 
regarding utilities, in South Africa is explored. The first major point of emphasis here is the 
condition of capacity in South Africa. Capacity for PPP development may serve as the main 
driver for governments to initiate PPPs and operate them successfully. As shown earlier, Africa 
in its entirety must be able to develop a capacity to plan, negotiate, implement and monitor 
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successful PPP projects in light of the current economic and financial conditions. South Africa 
is no exception. Moreover, without further development in the adjacent African countries, 
South Africa will struggle to successfully implement PPP projects. South Africa should, thus, 
follow the guidelines established under the PPP Manual and Standardised Provision, which, as 
shown earlier, provide the best guidance for actually developing the region sufficiently to 
introduce PPP projects in the area. Such projects are certainly achievable, given the previous 
development projects that have been successful in the region, especially through international 
financing.  
The question now is how ready is South Africa for PPPs? This question requires a look 
at the timeline for PPP development. A few years is insufficient for the required infrastructural 
development for PPPs, though only a basic infrastructure would be required. After all, PPPs 
can later serve to further enhance the state’s and the regional infrastructure. A strong argument 
has been made for PPPs being the best way for African countries to solve its infrastructure and 
service congestion. The differences between PPPs, procurement and privatisation are clear. The 
case studies, shown in the prior chapter, demonstrate that African countries that have attempted 
to use PPPs to solve their infrastructural problems and elaborated on their experiences more 
especially in the power sector can be successful. Thus, South Africa must learn from the prior 
success of PPP projects in the region. There are strong considerations, nonetheless, of the 
sectors for the use of PPPs. The specific project structure of PPPs are also a very relevant 
consideration, as are the types of PPP projects and how they will be financed. The legal 
accountability of PPPs and government bodies charged with overseeing them is also important 
in understanding the capacity of South Africa for certain PPPs. 
The division of public and private law is considered an antiquated principle premised 
on the antiquated notion that the state exists exclusively outside of the private sphere. This is 
no longer entirely applicable, given the increase in the number of states that serve as formidable 
commercial actors and which also rely heavily on contractual means to advance objectives of 
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the individual states. The importance of the distinction between public and private law in South 
Africa is the existing importance of minimizing corruption. Many private entities have become 
international conglomerates, giving them major power over consumers in South Africa and 
nearby countries. Because of the resulting multinational corporation, there are reasonable 
grounds for intervention.  There is also a notable increase in private parties performing public 
functions, leading to the question of why there is a continued staunch protection of private 
contractual relations in such cases. Thus, there are strong reasons for the determination of the 
capacity and appropriateness of PPP applications in South Africa, especially in relation to 
electricity and other utility functions. Through a comparison of German PPPs and future South 
African PPPs, a determination can be made regarding the appropriateness of such an 
application.  
4.4.4 The comparison 
As mentioned earlier, one of the most common PPP applications in Germany involves 
public buildings, this includes public utilities. In many cases, public utilities fall under the 
control of private parties who then have ultimate control over utility prices. For example, under 
German law, the state has the feed-in tariff system, discussed earlier which serves as an 
important function of electricity being provided to the state. Such tariffs in Germany and other 
countries contain several features that give unfair advantages to certain private parties, as well 
as certain international partners. The resulting high prices are, then, passed onto to other 
electricity consumers, both public and private entities.  
The problem identified here is that only upper-class individuals can afford to install the 
pricey solar systems, while providing no income redistribution scheme. In comparing German 
PPP solutions to possible South African energy PPP solutions, there is a serious concern about 
utilities falling into the hands of private organizations. After all, South Africa has a very high 
number of people in low socie-economic classes. In fact, most people living in South Africa are 
unable to purchase and install solar panels, which would be required for not paying very high 
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prices under the German electricity PPP scheme. Thus, this application of PPP would not be 
appropriate for South Africa. There would need to be a major adjustment to this system in order 
for the people of South Africa to be properly served by the South African government.   
Other PPPs may be more appropriate in South Africa. That is, even if electricity and 
other utility-based PPPs are not yet appropriate, there are grounds for PPP infrastructure 
projects in South Africa like those in Germany. For example, the roads expansion and repair 
program mentioned in detail earlier could easily be implemented in South Africa with much 
less concern about those of lower socie-economic statues being negatively affected. In fact, 
such a project could increase the earning potential for many South Africans, given the 
importance of infrastructure in development in such a state. Thus, there are sufficient grounds 
for the consideration of PPPs in South African concerning infrastructure. Once the capacity for 
such projects has been established, the country may begin constructing hypotheticals to 
determine the costs and benefits of PPPs, compared to traditional public works projects. If the 
appropriate administrators were in place, the PPPs would surely be successful. It should be 
noted, at this point, the importance of the public goals being stated at the outset of any PPP in 
South Africa, just as is required in Germany. This requirement intimately links PPPs in 
Germany with public goods, rather than private goods exclusively. This would be most 
appropriate for South Africa as well. 
If one were to however consider privatisation of Eskom as an energy utility, such 
privatisation would have to happen through PPP agreements in which the private party to the 
agreement is a private company that has clear elements of public interest. The procurement of 
such a party should be the one mentioned in the PPP regulations and privatisation should occur 
in such a way that private party has a use right of the government property or government asset 
in order to carry out its aims and objectives in delivering an efficient service. This would ensure 
that government assets and property are preserved and used for the greater public good while 
subjecting the private party to principles of public law such as procedural fairness, 
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reasonableness and lawfulness of actions. This will also ensure that once the objective of the 
PPP agreement has been fulfilled and the contract terminates, the government will retain its 
ownership right of the asset in question and continue using it for the benefit of the broader South 
African community. This can only work however if the lessons that were mentioned in the 
previous chapters are taken into account and procurement methods of PPPs are streamlined to 
be less complex and more understandable to parties who may be interested in offering services 
under PPP agreements. This will also only work if the process of procuring the private party is 
procedurally fair, free of corruption and more importantly that bodies such as NERSA which 
are mandated to protect infringement of laws (by entities such as Eskom) are not circumvented 
through less than kosher means to get their requests approved by the executive directly. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Froneman J states that the relationship between contract and administrative law is one 
that is contested and controversial.420 He argues that the final word has not been pronounced on 
this issue. This is very telling of the current position that our law finds itself in this area. The 
arguments advanced here indicate is that there is a need to move away from the strict 
classification by looking at what sets the state apart as a contracting party.421 Once the issue of 
classification is no longer our focus point then the law can look to how to deal with this different 
type of contract. The most important step to take is to understand the distinctiveness of the state 
and the reasons why contractual terms should sometimes give way to public interest and public 
policy considerations. Only then can a regulatory framework be set up in response to the 
contracting state.422 Logbro has shown us that the existence of a contract does not discharge the 
state from its duty to perform its public duties and that administrative principles determine the 
framework in which these contractual provisions operate. The fact that government enjoys 
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rights and carries out responsibilities in the contract is in no way exhaustive of all the rights and 
duties that are and should be imposed on the state. Thus, a government contract is a unique 
hybrid of contractual rights and duties imposed generally by the law. The extent of the duties 
application being dependent on the extent to which the state can be distinguished from the 
ordinary private market player.423   
In the preceding chapter, PPPs and the lessons to be learned from PPP's that have been 
initiated in Africa in the past have been discussed. Such lessons include the conclusion that 
politics matters, the idea that the government has to play a key role in initiating and procuring 
PPPs, in order for the PPPs to be a success. In the same vein, it is argued that although politics 
matters and the government must be involved in the PPP procurement process and beyond, it is 
vital that the involvement of the government does not translate to them furthering corrupt ends. 
This led to the next lesson which was that corruption is an effective terminator of PPPs and 
must be avoided at all times. Also discussed were local economic empowerment, risk transfer 
and risk management and the regulation of the private sector and enforcing contracts.  
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION: EFFECTS OF ESKOM PPP AND HOW 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SHOULD RESPOND 
It was the purpose of this study that the subject of PPPs in South Africa be explored in 
detail. The main focus of the study has been on the prospects for PPP development in the energy 
sector in South Africa, based on previous PPP attempts. In particular, the distinction between 
private and public law applications between various PPP applications has been examined in 
some detail. Thus, it was intended that this dissertation address issues concerning various 
aspects of administrative law related to PPPs. This was intended to help make a determination 
about the following issue: whether in South Africa the complete privatisation of electricity 
provision through Eskom is desirable. The preliminary answer to this question is that such a 
privatisation effort at this point in time would be unacceptable given the current socio-economic 
conditions of South Africa. The goals behind such an effort are, of course admirable, but the 
practical implementation would be disastrous for the poor in South Africa. As shown in the 
case study comparison above, Germany has previously implemented a similar project. For low-
income Germans who could not afford solar panels, such privatisation was harmful. This effect 
would be magnified in South Africa which has a very high population of individuals in low 
socio-economic classes. The result would be much of the South African population would suffer 
as a result of the change. Specifically, there would be a noticeable denial of access to electricity 
and possibly an infringement of other fundamental human rights in such populations as a result. 
Moreover, the clear lack of financial strength to pay for the continued use of electricity would 
be highly problematic for residents.  
5.1 Importance of results 
Explored here are the many reasons why this study was important and why its results 
will remain important in the development of Africa. Numerous African countries are shifting 
towards privatisation, transforming previously public enterprises to private enterprises on the 
advice of international institutions. This study was intended to investigate and make a 
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determination about how such privatisation would affect socio-economic rights. Specifically, 
there are serious concerns about what the denial of the right of access to electricity would mean 
for populations in South Africa. It is clear that electricity has become an important aspect of 
daily life in South Africa and that its denial would be detrimental to a large portion of the 
population. Moreover, the current energy crisis debate which has opened a door to the 
introduction of a nuclear energy plant and previously frequent power cuts have made is 
necessary to analyse where the law stands with regard to the right of access to electricity. While 
this question has not been answered sufficiently, it is worth exploring in future research: is there 
a duty on government to provide free basic electricity to the people of South Africa? The 
associations between electricity access and well-being are so strong, now, that there is a strong 
argument in favour of such a duty 
5.2 Research question answers 
The first research question for this dissertation was what are the specific effects of the 
privatisation of public services, such as the operation of utilities and roadways? Based on the 
findings in this project, it seems clear that one of the major risks of the privatisation of utilities 
is the deprivation of access to such utilities for impoverished individuals. The case study of 
Germany’s privatisation of electricity reveals decreased access to impoverished communities. 
If applied to South Africa, which has a much higher impoverished population, the risk of the 
poor population losing access to electricity is much greater.  
The second research question was what are the specific effects of the establishment of 
PPPs by governments and private entities? It is certainly feasible that the privatisation of public 
services can be completed in such a way that fairness and individual justice are achieved. Even 
in the case of Eskom, it is feasible that the proper restrictions can be put in place that limit the 
deleterious effects of PPPs. Nonetheless, any capitalist system will contribute in some ways to 
inequality. The privatisation of Eskom, then, risks some forms of inequality being increased. 
Yet, social support can counteract many of these inequalities. Nonetheless, the focus of the 
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current project is on administrative law and the proximate effects of the privatisation of Eskom. 
Based on the outcomes of the privatisation of German’s electricity industry, South African 
lawmakers should be aware of the dangers of injustice surrounding such privatisation, 
especially given its high population of individuals with low incomes.  
The third research question was how have the recently-established PPPs in the 
electricity industry in Germany affected the population of Germany? The establishment of PPPs 
in the electricity industry in Germany has certainly affected the populations of Germany in 
various ways. As a whole, Germany has shifted towards renewable energy, such as solar energy, 
which has inherent ecological and sustainability benefits. Nonetheless, the effects on disparate 
populations are just as clear. The impoverished in Germany cannot afford solar panels. Coupled 
with the spiking costs of electricity in some parts of Germany under PPPs, the inability to afford 
solar panels has decreased access to electricity for many Germans. The case study reveals clear 
problems in the provisions and requirements of the establishment of PPPs in the electricity 
industry in Germany. Applied to South Africa, these problems may be on a much greater scale.  
The fourth research question is the following: based on the effects of PPPs in the 
Germany electricity industry, what effects are expected from the Eskom PPPs in South Africa? 
Such an examination suggests that the shift towards privatisation comes with major risks for 
South Africans. South African courts can certainly examine whether the risk for the deprivation 
of electricity could amount to a constitutional violation taking into account how many protected 
rights can be negatively affected, but such an argument would be difficult to prove in court. 
The reason is that the Court has held that access to electricity is based on an assessment of 
whether it is national, provincial or local government that is in question and secondly whether 
electricity is available or not and most importantly whether there are sufficient resources to 
enable everyone to have access to electricity. Rather, South African lawmakers should focus on 
PPP contract structures with minimum guarantees for public goods for the entire public and not 
simply for certain socie-economic classes.  
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The fifth research question is do the Eskom PPPs endanger the rights of South African 
populations, such that there are grounds for Constitutional violations? There is insufficient 
evidence to suggest that the current partial privatisation of Eskom violates constitutional and 
international human rights standards. However, the risk of such violations is present, especially 
after considering the potential effects on those of lower socio-economic classes. The 
effectiveness of the privatisation and its efficiency is also in question and highlights the need 
for guaranteed minimums for public goods across the entire socio-economic spectrum. PPP 
contracts coupled with strong regulations can lead to the sort of operational efficiency and 
guaranteed public protections that would minimize the risk for international human rights 
violations and maintain the benefits of competition. 
 The sixth research question is how should administrative law be adapted to be 
appropriately responsive to PPPs in South Africa? Based on the information available, it is 
quite clear that South African administrative law must ensure that all PPPs have clear goals and 
that the private parties involved are dedicated to meet the minimum social goals established by 
South African law-makers. Administrative law should be responsive to PPPs through the 
establishment of law specifically related to the structural requirements for PPPs. In other words, 
PPPs in South Africa should not be treated as if private companies will be seeking to maximize 
the public good during the course of its public works projects. After all, the private parties 
behind PPPs are still aimed at profit, even at the cost of the general public or particular socio-
economic classes.  
The Germany case study revealed major deficiencies in the public utilities planning for 
Germans who could not afford solar panels. The result was one public good being achieved, 
while another was harmed. Namely, the reduction in ecological pollution through improved 
energy efficiency was achieved, but at the cost of electricity rate hikes for those in low socio-
economic classes. This dampened the prospects of individuals in such classes, during a time of 
relatively high unemployment. South African should learn from the mistakes of Germany 
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through the creation of PPP structures and mandates requiring that the costs of privatisation be 
weighed across all socio-economic classes. This is not only required for the preservation of the 
public purposes of PPPs, but possibly also for the guarantee of human rights enjoyment in South 
Africa. After all, utilities such as electricity are so intimately linked to maintaining a minimum 
quality of life in South Africa that risks to such utilities and similar public functions puts the 
quality of life of many South Africans at risk.  
5.3 Ensuring accountability in South African PPPs 
PPP contracts require sufficient accountability. The concept of accountability is 
premised on the notion of democracy and a democratic society and the principles of good 
governance. South Africa’s system of administrative law is informed by two aspects, that of 
empowerment and secondly accountability. Much focus and emphasis has been placed on 
accountability to the detriment of the empowering aspect of the administrative law. The irony 
of this set up is that in PPPs, accountability enjoys no such favour or stature. Fombad424 argues 
that in order to understand accountability, one needs to consider the three legs which make up 
accountability.425  
The first leg is that of hierarchical accountability, secondly the horizontal perspective 
and lastly, accountability as a virtue. Together these three dimensions help to advance one's 
understanding of accountability in PPPs.426The hierarchical aspect of accountability is premised 
on the traditional idea of accountability where the vertical chain of authority is inherent and the 
principal and agent relations are enunciated in hierarchical and bureaucratic situations.427 The 
hierarchical notion of accountability introduces a structure where individuals are in a position 
in which they are responsible for reporting, justifying and explaining their actions to their 
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relevant authorities, and in instances where it is found that they have acted ultra vires, or in the 
absence of an empowering legislation and thus they find themselves exposed to sanctions.428 
From this it is evident that the hierarchical aspect of accountability prioritises reporting and 
formal sanctions, thus it has been argued that this makes it less suitable to PPPs, due to the 
complexity, multiplicity and conflicting undertakings of stakeholders to which the upshot is 
that public and private sector responsibilities are blurred.429 Hierarchical accountability is 
important in the understanding of PPPs as PPPs are essentially public investments, that affect 
the rights and interests of the public and thus it stands to reason that the public officials must 
explain to the public how they are fulfilling the substantive values of democracy and how they 
are providing public goods and services.430  
Due to the shortcoming of the hierarchical aspect of accountability, some academics 
have preferred the second leg of accountability which is the horizontal aspect. This dimension 
is also referred to as management of expectations, it provides a practical and more realistic 
approach to understanding PPPs.431 The hierarchical dimension of management of expectations 
aids discourse around how numerous expectations generated within and outside partnerships 
often with conflicting objectives can be managed in a non-hierarchical way.432  The process 
here involves identifying each player’s expectations, aligning their goals, adjusting strategies, 
assessing implementations, communicating performance and facilitating learning.433  
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The third leg of accountability is that of accountability as a virtue, essentially the notion 
that one must have a conscience or a moral responsibility about what one is doing.434 This 
dimension is seen to be a way to deal with potentially problematic situations which expose 
themselves to excuse making, justification, rationalisation and other forms of account giving.435 
The importance of integrity and moral responsibility make accountability as a virtue a very 
important aspect of accountability in PPPs.436  This aspect requires that one formulate a set of 
standards for evaluating the behaviour of public actors.437 An example of accountability as a 
virtue is the Seven Principles of Public Life which includes notions such as selflessness, 
integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership, which provides a 
valuable framework for evaluating the ethical behaviour of public officials.438   
These three legs of accountability combined serve to inform what has been termed the 
frameworks of accountability. Together these dimensions serve to balance and illuminate each 
other’s weaknesses and strengths. The practical layout of this argument is that the hierarchical 
aspect of accountability performs a checking function to those responsible for the performance 
of PPPs, while the numerous accountability relations in PPPs results in performance 
expectations from diverse stakeholders who are non-hierarchical in nature. The last leg of 
accountability then helps public managers to adhere to professional ethics and responsible 
behaviour.  
5.4 Ensuring proper employment in South African PPPs 
The nature of PPPs is such that they predominantly lend themselves to be used by 
players who have the public sector playing a key role, thus making PPPs occur where there is 
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a need for efficient service delivery on local services and activities.439 It can therefore be argued 
that PPPs may be set up for all public services by local authorities provided that there are no 
statutory limitations to full or partial privatisation.440 
 
5.5 Required project structures of South African PPPs 
The paper also touched on the required project structures for PPPs in South Africa and 
it was argued that such structures must be compliant with the current South African 
Constitution, which has been discussed in some detail earlier. The practical requirements for 
the project structures of South African PPPs included considerations of the impacts on lower 
socie-economic classes in the state. After all, as discussed in the comparison between Germany 
and South African in Chapter 4, PPP structures such as those implemented in German utility 
PPPs are impractical in South Africa, given the proportion of the South African population 
living in impoverished conditions, unable to afford the resulting price hikes. The paper went on 
to discuss that the South African Treasury has adopted a four-stage process in the life of a PPP 
project, inception, the feasibility study, procurement and the implementation stage. The 
inception stage was said to be when the institution which is procuring registers the project with 
the South African Treasury’s PPP unit. The second part requires the procuring institution to 
select a private sector advisor who will perform a feasibility study to determine the most 
suitable mechanism to procuring the project. The third stage is the actual procurement stage, 
which takes place if and when the feasibility study has been completed and its outcomes 
indicate that a PPP is a viable solution. The procuring institution then extends an invitation to 
the market for bids for the infrastructure and or service provision of the project. The final stage 
is that of implementation, when the most appropriate bidder has been selected. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The primary conclusion of this research project is that the privatisation of the utility of 
electricity in South Africa through Eskom would not be beneficial for the South African 
population and would, in fact, be antithetical to the guarantees of protections under the 
Constitution of South Africa. Nonetheless, it is the secondary conclusion of this research  that 
PPPs are viable in South Africa, especially in the next decade which will see the infrastructure 
of South Africa become even more developed. Such initial infrastructure development will 
provide the groundwork for PPPs aimed at further improving the state’s infrastructure.  
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